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Ending Africa’s Poverty Trap 
Africa’s development crisis is unique. Not only is Africa the poorest
region in the world, but it was also the only major developing region with
negative growth in income per capita during 1980–2000 (table 1). Some
African countries grew during the 1990s, but for the most part this growth
recovered ground lost during the 1980s. Moreover, Africa’s health condi-
tions are by far the worst on the planet. The AIDS pandemic is wreaking
havoc, as is the resurgence of malaria due to rising drug resistance and
the lack of effective public health systems. Africa’s population continues
to soar, adding ecological stresses to the economic strains. Policy-based
development lending to Africa over the past twenty years, known as struc-
tural adjustment lending, did not solve the problem. A heavy debt burden
is evidenced by the 155 Paris Club restructurings of African countries’
debt between 1980 and 2001, much more than for any other region. In
general, Africa remains mired in poverty and debt.
This paper focuses on the tropical sub-Saharan African countries with
populations of at least 2 million people in 2001. We leave out North Africa
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia,), southernmost Africa
(Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland), and a num-
ber of very small economies (Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, São Tomé and
Principe, and Seychelles). Both nontropical ends of Africa are much richer
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2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  117than tropical Africa. They grow temperate crops, escape the worst of
malaria, enjoy (in the south) vast deposits per capita of gold and diamonds,
and (in the north) benefit from proximity to EU markets. The smallest
economies present idiosyncrasies that would distract more than inform
the analysis.
The thirty-three sub-Saharan African countries on which we focus (and
which are listed in table 2) had a combined population of 617 million in
2001, with a population-weighted average annual income of $271 per per-
son, or a mere 74 cents a day. Every country on the list is a low-income
country according to World Bank country classiﬁcations, and twenty-six
are among the forty-nine Least Developed Countries in the world by the
United Nations classiﬁcation. Of the four countries with income per capita
of $500 or more, three (Angola, Cameroon, and Congo) are oil exporters,
and only Côte d’Ivoire, which is currently in a vertiginous political and
economic collapse, is a non-oil exporter. Every country on the list has a life
expectancy at birth below sixty years, and in all but Ghana, Madagascar,
and Sudan life expectancy at birth is below ﬁfty-ﬁve years. Child mortal-
ity rates (deaths before the age of ﬁve per 1,000 live births) are above 100
in every country.
The standard diagnosis is that Africa is suffering from a governance
crisis. With highly visible examples of profoundly poor governance, for
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Table 1. Selected Development Indicators for Major Developing Regionsa
Average
annual Under-ﬁve Average
growth Life  mortality  annual 
GNI  in GDP  expectancy rate, 2001  growth in
per capita,  per capita, at birth, (deaths population,
2001 1980–2000 2001 per  1,000 2001
Region (dollars)b (percent) (years) live births)  (percent)
Tropical sub-Saharan  271 –1.1 46.0 172.5 2.3
Africac
South Asia 449 3.3 62.6 95.3 1.7
Latin America 3,669 0.5 70.6 32.7 1.4
East Asia and  3,710 6.4 70.2 38.3 0.8
the Paciﬁc
Middle East and  2,207 0.9 68.4 49.8 2.0
North Africa
Source: World Bank (2003a). 
a. Population-weighted averages of countries in the region.
b. GNI, gross national income.
c. Thirty-three-country sample listed in table 2; other regions are as deﬁned by the World Bank.
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Table 2. Governance Ratings and Household Consumption 
in Tropical Sub-Saharan Africa
Rating   Household 
based on  Rating ﬁnal 
World Bank  based on  consumption 
governance Transparency  Freedom  expenditure 
indicators, International  House  per capita, 2000
Country 2002a index, 2003a  rating, 2003 (1980 = 100)
Benin Good n.a. Free 98.9
Burkina Faso Good n.a. Partly free 111.0
Ghana Good Average Free 92.8
Madagascar Good Good Partly free 64.0
Malawi Good Good Partly free 111.2
Mali Good Good Free 95.3
Mauritania Good Good Partly free 104.8
Senegal Good Good Free 99.6
Cameroon Average Average Not free 102.5
Central African Rep. Average n.a. Partly free n.a.
Chad Average n.a. Not free n.a.
Congo, Rep. of Average Average n.a. 80.5
Côte d’Ivoire Average Average Not free 78.2
Eritrea Average n.a. Not free n.a.
Ethiopia Average Good Partly free n.a.
Guinea Average n.a. Not free n.a.
Kenya Average Average Partly free 100.7
Mozambique Average Good Partly free 79.4
Niger Average n.a. Partly free n.a.
Nigeria Average Average Partly free n.a.
Rwanda Average n.a. Not free 83.9
Sierra Leone Average Good Partly free 43.9
Tanzania Average Good Partly free n.a.
Togo Average n.a. Not free 112.4
Uganda Average Average Partly free n.a.
Zambia Average Good Partly free 47.0
Angola Poor Poor Not free n.a.
Burundi Poor n.a. Not free 65.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. of Poor n.a. Not free 45.1
Sudan Poor Average Not free n.a.
Zimbabwe Poor Average Not free 88.4
Liberia n.a. n.a. Not free n.a.
Somalia n.a. n.a. Not free n.a.
Sources: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003); Radelet (2004); authors’ calculations using data in Transparency Inter-
national (2004); Freedom House (2003); World Bank (2003a).
n.a., not available. 
a. Determined from the residuals of a regression of countries’ governance indicators or scores on income per capita (at pur-
chasing power parity); countries with residuals more than 1 standard deviation above or 1 standard deviation below the predicted
value are categorized as “good” or “poor,” respectively, and those with residuals within 1 standard deviation as “average.” For the
ﬁrst column, the World Bank governance indicators are those calculated by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). For the sec-
ond column, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index is used, which relates to the degree of corruption in the
country as perceived by business people, academics, and risk analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  119example in Zimbabwe, and widespread war and violence, as in Angola,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan,
the impression of a continent-wide governance crisis is understandable.
Yet it is wrong. Many parts of Africa are well governed even though stuck
in poverty. Governance is a problem, but Africa’s development chal-
lenges run much deeper.
Using our thirty-three-country sample, table 2 reports some common
governance indicators that make this point. The first column presents a
ranking of African governance compiled by Steven Radelet,1 who regresses
a set of widely used World Bank governance indicators due to Daniel
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi on GDP per capita,2 and
ranks countries according to the residuals from that regression, thereby
standardizing the measurement of governance by level of income. This
procedure recognizes that poorer countries have systematically poorer
governance measures than richer countries, since good governance itself
requires real resources. Well-governed African countries are defined as
those with residuals at least 1 standard error above, and poorly governed
countries as those with residuals at least 1 standard error below, the
regression line. “Average” countries are those with residuals within
1 standard error on either side of the regression line. The table shows
that, by this ranking, many countries are well governed. Nor is there
evidence that Africa’s governance, on average, is worse than elsewhere
once we control for income levels: a regression (not reported in this
paper) of several different governance indicators on the logarithm of GDP
per capita (measured at purchasing power parity) and a dummy for trop-
ical sub-Saharan Africa results in a statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient
for the dummy variable.
The second column of table 2 repeats the same procedure using the Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International.3 All but one of
the African countries in our sample for which scores are available receive
scores of “good” (that is, low corruption) or “average” after we control for
income. The third column reminds us as well that many African countries
have become democracies in recent years, and thus are scored as “free” or
“partly free” by the well-known Freedom House ranking.4 The ﬁnal col-
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1. Radelet (2004).
2. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003).
3. Transparency International (2004).
4. Freedom House (2003).
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a percentage of its 1980 level, to point out that many of the relatively well
governed African countries have been unable to increase the material
well-being of their populations. Table 3 makes this point more systemati-
cally in a cross-country regression, which shows that, after we control for
initial income in 1980 and the quality of governance (according to several
alternative measures), sub-Saharan African countries grew more slowly
than other developing countries, by around 3 percentage points a year.
Africa’s crisis requires a better explanation than governance alone.
Our explanation is that tropical Africa, even the well-governed parts, is
stuck in a poverty trap, too poor to achieve robust, high levels of
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Table 3. Regressions Explaining Economic Growth in Tropical Sub-Saharan 
Africa with Governance Indicatorsa
Independent variable 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5
Dummy variable for tropical –3.28 –3.06 –2.68 –3.43 –3.40
sub-Saharan Africab (–6.56) (–6.50) (–6.11) (–7.05) (–6.46)
Corruption Perceptions  0.83 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Index, 2003c (5.23)
Index of Economic Freedom,  . . . –0.96 . . . . . . . . .
2001d (–2.75)
Average Kaufmann, Kraay, . . . . . . 1.89 . . . . . .
Zoido-Lobaton indicators,  (5.91)
2000e
Average ICRG indicators,  . . . . . . . . . 1.56 . . .
1982–97f (5.29)
Average ICRG indicators, 1982f . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.68
(3.78)
Logarithm of GDP per capita  –2.07 –1.65 –1.75 –2.00 –1.82
(at purchasing power  (–7.02) (–6.06) (–7.07) (–7.01) (–5.84)
parity), 1980
R2 0.58 0.46 0.59 0.59 0.54
No. of observations 60 71 78 65 52
Sources: Authors’ regressions using data from Transparency International (2004); Miles, Feulner, and O’Grady (2004); Kauf-
mann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2002); PSR Group (2004); World Bank (2003a).
a. The dependent variable is average annual growth of GDP per capita, 1980–2000. The sample consists of ninety-two coun-
tries worldwide, excluding high-income countries and former republics of the Soviet Union. All regressions are ordinary least
squares and include a constant term (not reported). Numbers in parentheses are t statistics; all coefﬁcients reach statistical signif-
icance at the 1 percent level.
b. Variable equals 1 if the country is one of the thirty-three countries listed in table 2.
c. See table 2 for description.
d. The index is published by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal and ranges from 1 to 5, where 5 indicates the
greatest government interference in the economy and the least economic freedom.
e. Average of six World Bank governance indicators measured in units ranging from about –2.5 to 2.5, with higher values cor-
responding to better governance outcomes.
f. Average of six governance indicators from the International Country Risk Guide, with values ranging from 1 to 6, with
higher values reﬂecting better governance.
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More policy or governance reform, by itself, will not be sufﬁcient to over-
come this trap. Speciﬁcally, Africa’s extreme poverty leads to low
national saving rates, which in turn lead to low or negative economic
growth rates. Low domestic saving is not offset by large inﬂows of private
foreign capital, for example foreign direct investment, because Africa’s
poor infrastructure and weak human capital discourage such inﬂows.
With very low domestic saving and low rates of market-based foreign
capital inﬂows, there is little in Africa’s current dynamics that promotes
an escape from poverty. Something new is needed.
We argue that what is needed is a “big push” in public investments to
produce a rapid “step” increase in Africa’s underlying productivity, both
rural and urban. The intervention of foreign donors will be critical to
achieving this step increase. In particular, we argue that well-governed
African countries should be offered a substantial increase in official de-
velopment assistance (ODA) to enable them to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), the internationally agreed targets for poverty
reduction, by 2015.6 The goals are useful intermediate targets for break-
ing Africa’s poverty trap, because they address the key sectors in which
major productivity improvements are both needed and achievable, and
because the rich countries have repeatedly committed themselves to help-
122 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
5. The concept of a low-level poverty trap is, of course, a long-standing hypothesis in
the theories of economic growth and development. The earliest mathematical formalization
was by Nelson (1956). The theoretical possibility of poverty traps in the neoclassical
growth model is covered brieﬂy in the economic growth textbook by Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1998), which also discusses brieﬂy the possible case for large-scale development
assistance to overcome such traps. The connection of a low-level trap to subsistence con-
sumption needs is spelled out in Ben-David (1998), and connections to agriculture and edu-
cation are described in the World Economic and Social Survey 2000. Two recent empirical
studies claiming that such poverty traps exist in very poor countries are UNCTAD (2002)
and Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2003).
6. Adopted by the world’s leaders in September 2000, the UN Millennium Declaration
committed their nations to stronger global efforts to reduce poverty, improve health, and
promote peace, human rights, and environmental sustainability. The MDGs that emerged
from the declaration are speciﬁc, measurable targets, summarized by the following eight
goals: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; pro-
mote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal
health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainabil-
ity; and develop a global partnership for development. More information is available at
www. unmillenniumproject.org and www.un.org/millenniumgoals.
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the rich countries have not yet delivered on that promise.
We begin by outlining our theory of Africa’s poverty trap. This is fol-
lowed by a discussion of the structural conditions and history that have
led the continent into such a trap. Following that, we identify how a big
push in key investments could enable Africa to meet the MDGs, and how
that, in turn, would help to extricate Africa from its current development
trap. We then estimate the ﬁnancial costs required to meet the MDGs, and
we suggest how those costs could be allocated between domestic resources
in Africa (both public and private) and increased ODA. Finally, we pro-
pose a new framework for donor-African relations to underpin a big push
designed to meet the MDGs.
The Theory of Africa’s Poverty Trap
Consider a standard neoclassical growth model in which output per
capita q is produced by a production function Af(k), where A is total fac-
tor productivity and k is the capital-labor ratio. For the moment we take A
to be constant. The national saving rate is s, and d is the rate of capital
depreciation, with n denoting the rate of population growth. The rate of
capital accumulation dk/dt is given by
A change in the capital-labor ratio is called capital deepening. The term
(n + d)k is called capital widening and is equal to the amount of saving
per capita that is needed to hold the capital-labor ratio constant in the face
of population growth and depreciation. Equation 1 says that capital deep-
ening equals saving per capita minus capital widening.
() / ()–( ). 1d d f kt s A k n d k =+
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7. Perhaps the clearest commitment is in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus of the Inter-
national Conference on Financing for Development, where in paragraph 42 all countries
(including the United States, the European Union, and other donors) adopted the follow-
ing position: “[W]e urge developed countries that have not done so to make concrete
efforts towards the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to
developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of GNP of developed countries to least
developed countries . . .” (pp. 9–10). ODA was 0.23 percent of the combined gross
national income of donor countries (members of the OECD’s Development Assistance
Committee) in 2002, a shortfall of approximately $120 billion a year on a combined donor
GNP of around $25 trillion.








Figure 1. Standard Neoclassical Growth Model
Source: Authors’ model described in the text.
The economy grows in per capita terms as long as saving per capita
exceeds capital widening. If saving is lower than capital widening, the
economy experiences a decline in output per capita. The standard neo-
classical model is typically presented as if the economy necessarily grows
when k is very low, in the famous diagram reproduced in ﬁgure 1. In the
ﬁgure, sAf(k) is assumed to be very steep at the origin and, in particular,
steeper than the (n + d)k ray from the origin. In that case, when k is low,
dk/dt is positive, since it is equal to the vertical distance between the
sAf(k) curve and the (n + d)k ray. Indeed, starting at a very low capital-
labor ratio, k and q rise asymptotically to a unique, positive steady-state
equilibrium at kE and qE = Af(kE).
Actually, ﬁgure 1 is a special case, and a not very plausible one at that.
When k is very low, two other things tend to be true. First, the marginal
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productivity of capital also tends to be very low (instead of nearly inﬁnite,
as the standard theory assumes), because a minimum threshold of capital
is needed before modern production processes can be started. Factory pro-
duction requires, for example, a basic infrastructure of electricity, roads,
and a functioning port, as well as a literate and numerate labor force.
When these basic conditions are not present, small increments of k may
have little effect. However, once the basic infrastructure and human capi-
tal are in place, the marginal productivity of capital may indeed become
very high in a low-income country. The capital threshold can be seen in
figure 2: small increments of k below a threshold kT might do little to raise
production, and the sAf(k) curve might be very ﬂat near the origin. It then
becomes steep in a middle range before ﬂattening out once again at high
levels of k. In short, there is an early period of increasing returns to scale









Figure 2. Growth Model with Minimum Capital Stock Threshold
Source: Authors’ model described in the text.
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k is very low, because impoverished households do not save, but rather
must use all (or more than all) of their current income in the struggle just
to stay alive. Once basic needs are met, poor households may save quite a
lot of income, but not before. The saving trap leads to a picture like ﬁgure
3, in which sAf(k) is less steep than (n + d )k when k is very low, and then
turns steeper in an intermediate range. Note that sAf(k) looks as it does in
figure 2 even without assuming a threshold level of capital. The key
implication of ﬁgures 2 and 3 is that dk/dt is negative when k < kT. When
an economy begins with very low capital, both the capital-labor ratio
and output per capita tend to decline over time. The very poor indeed get
poorer, pushed into more extreme poverty by the lack of capital accu-








Figure 3. Saving Trap
Source: Authors’ model described in the text.
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capital-labor ratio above a minimum threshold kT does it tend to achieve
economic growth and converge to the steady-state kE and qE.
To formalize these ideas using the simplest version of the neoclassical
model, we can use the Harrod-Domar or AK model, in which q = Ak. In
this case, equation 1 becomes
The proportionate growth rate of the economy is given by
The economy grows if sA > (n + d) and declines if sA < (n + d). As is well
known, the AK model does not have a steady-state equilibrium. The econ-
omy either grows or declines at a constant rate.
Let us now see how a poverty trap arises in the AK model, beginning
with a capital threshold. Suppose that A is low (AL) until a threshold level
of infrastructure capital kT (the minimum capital needed for roads, ports,
electric power, and human capital) is reached, and then becomes high
(AH > AL). If it is the case that sAL < n + d while sAH > n + d, the economy
can get stuck in a poverty trap. Speciﬁcally, if the capital stock starts
below kT, the economy shrinks at the rate sAL − (n + d) < 0, whereas if k
starts above kT, the economy grows at the rate sAH − (n + d) > 0. The pic-
ture is similar to ﬁgure 2, with a relatively ﬂat sAf(k) curve near the ori-
gin, but with a vertical segment at k = kT as the economy transits from AL
to AH, and then a relatively steep segment for k > kT.
Consider alternatively the case of the saving trap, in which the saving
rate is very low or negative when k is very low. As an illustration, suppose
that households save a constant fraction σ not of total income but of dis-
cretionary income, which we deﬁne as income after deducting the costs of
meeting basic needs. Poor countries calculate basic needs according to an
estimate of the minimum caloric intake necessary for a healthy and pro-
ductive life, plus ancillary essential needs of clothing, shelter, cooking
fuel, and a few other basic amenities. Let these minimum needs be repre-
sented by the poverty line qP = AkP. Discretionary income is then qd = q −
qP if q > qp and qd = 0 otherwise. We assume that saving per capita sq is
equal to σqd. The saving function is therefore
() (/) / – () . 3 γ= = + lq q t s A n d dd
() / – () . 2d d k t sAk n d k =+
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the AK model, the capital stock must be greater than or equal to kT =
σAkP/[σA − (n + d)] to achieve positive economic growth. The growth
rate is easily calculated to be as follows:
There is a long theoretical tradition and strong empirical evidence to sup-
port the proposition that the saving rate is very low at low income levels
and rises as income rises above the poverty threshold. Simon Kuznets
remarked, in his classic study on Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Struc-
ture, and Spread, that “It is hardly surprising that with the much lower
per capita product in the underdeveloped countries, their gross or net capi-
tal formation proportions—which represent gross or net national saving
rates—are distinctly lower than those of industrial countries.”8 Norman
Loayza, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, and Luís Servén ﬁnd that, in developing
countries, a doubling of private income raises the long-run private saving
rate by 10 percentage points.9 Many other studies have shown that saving
rates rise at low levels of income.10 In an interesting unpublished survey
of rural Ugandan households, only 23.8 percent indicated that they had
undertaken any saving, and “the most common reason given for not saving
was low income (85.4 percent), although a number of non-saving respon-
dents also referred to the poor access to ﬁnancial institutions.”11
A third factor that can push an economy into a poverty trap is very
rapid population growth at low levels of k. Very poor people do not save
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8. Kuznets (1966, p. 427).
9. Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000). 
10. For example, Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart (1996).
11. Musinguzi and Smith (2000, p. 9). 
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is quite possible that sA < n + d when k is low and n is high, whereas sA >
n + d when k is high and hence n is low. This is diagrammed in ﬁgure 4.
The highest fertility rates in the world are observed among the world’s
poorest people. This initially seems paradoxical, since the poorest people
have the least chance to actually care for and invest in such large families.
But ample research on fertility choices in low-income settings has
explained this paradoxical situation very well. First, children are net eco-
nomic assets from an early age in rural areas where most poor people live
(or, in a less extreme version, they are a much smaller net cost than chil-
dren in urban areas). They collect fuel wood and water and tend to the ani-
mals and other household chores. Second, the children of the poor are
more likely than other children to die, and so risk-averse poor parents have
large numbers of children to compensate, and indeed a much larger num-
ber than needed simply to break even in an actuarial sense. Third, parents








Figure 4. Demographic Trap
Source: Authors’ model described in the text.
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reliable private or public old-age ﬁnancing scheme. Fourth, poor families
lack access to contraceptives and family planning services, so there is
considerable unmet desire to limit childbearing: about 17 percent of mar-
ried women in developing countries would prefer to avoid a pregnancy
but are not using any form of family planning.12
These three factors—capital thresholds, saving traps, and demographic
traps—all interact. It is quite possible that no one of them would be sufﬁ-
cient by itself to cause a poverty trap, but that they do so in combination.
For example, a country with substandard infrastructure may ﬁnd itself with
a low level of productivity AL, which by itself would not create a trap, but
does so when combined with the low saving rate and high population
growth rate caused by the low productivity.
In any case, positive growth in income per capita is more likely if there
is rapid technological change. When A is rising, the growth equation
(equation 3) becomes
We shall see, alas, that Africa suffers not only from low A, low s, and high
n, but also from very slow growth in total factor productivity. The slow
rise or stagnation of A is mainly for structural rather than governance rea-
sons, as we discuss later.
Why Has Africa Suffered the Most Persistent Poverty Trap?
The simple theory outlined above explains how a country or region can
get stuck in a poverty trap. It does not explain, however, why sub-Saharan
Africa has been the region most prone to getting stuck. We propose ﬁve
structural reasons that have made sub-Saharan Africa the most vulnerable
region in the world to a persistent poverty trap:
—very high transport costs and small market size
—low-productivity agriculture
—a very high disease burden
() . 61 γ= − + () + () ( ) sA n d A A t dd
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12. Ross and Winfrey (2002), who estimate the corresponding ﬁgure to be highest in
sub-Saharan Africa, at 24 percent.
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—very slow diffusion of technology from abroad.
In combination, these produce the conﬂuence of low A, low s, and high n
that characterizes Africa.
High Transport Costs and Small Market Size
To a remarkable extent, Africans live in the interior of the continent
and face enormous transport costs in shipping goods between coastal
ports and the places where they live and work. Moreover, the Sahara
effectively cuts sub-Saharan Africa off from high-volume overland trade
with its major high-income trading partner, Europe, and this fact increases
the high costs of transport. Problems of isolation are compounded by
small market size. Small developing countries with little access to global
trade tend to grow more slowly than countries with large internal markets,
or than countries that have easy access to trade (such as Singapore).13
There are several reasons why Africans tend to live away from the
coast: the soils are often better and rainfall is more plentiful in the interior
highland regions; the burden of malaria is intrinsically lower there; and
centuries of slave trade made it dangerous for Africans to live near the
coast. This problem would not be so severe if the rivers from the interior
to the coast of Africa were navigable by oceangoing vessels, but they are
not. Economists are gradually returning to the wisdom of Adam Smith,
who recognized, in The Wealth of Nations, the long-standing low levels
of development in Africa and the fundamental role of transport costs in
impeding prosperity in the region:
There are in Africa none of those great inlets, such as the Baltic and Adriatic
seas in Europe, the Mediterranean and Euxine [Black] seas in both Europe and
Asia, and the gulphs of Arabia, Persia, India, Bengal, and Siam, in Asia, to
carry maritime commerce into the interior parts of that great continent; and the
great rivers of Africa are at too great a distance from one another to give occa-
sion to any considerable inland navigation.14
Recent evidence underscores the extremely high transport costs in sub-
Saharan Africa and their severe impact on trade. Figure 5 compares the
much higher transport costs in sub-Saharan Africa relative to those in
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13. Sachs (forthcoming). 
14. Smith (1776/1976, Book I, Chapter iii, para. 8).
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port costs could increase the volume of transport by a factor of ﬁve.15
Before high-intensity modern trade can get started, Africa needs an exten-
sive road system both from the coast to the interior and within the interior,
where the highest population concentrations are found. These roads, how-
ever, are very expensive to build and maintain.
In terms of our simple model with AL and AH, we can say that Africa
could have the same AH as other regions, but it must invest in very costly
transport infrastructure to be on a par with other developing regions 
that have lower transport costs. These transport costs therefore cause
Africa to be stuck with AL, which in turn contributes to the low-level
poverty trap.
Low-Productivity Agriculture
Africa gets no break on food productivity. Most Africans live in the sub-
humid or arid tropics, with few rivers to provide irrigation and a lack of the
132 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
15. Limao and Venables (1999). Other relevant evidence includes that provided by
Rizet and Hine (1993), who found that long-distance freight tariffs in francophone West
Africa were over ﬁve times higher than comparable tariffs in India, Pakistan, and Vietnam
between 1986 and 1988. More recently, Hine and Ellis (2001) have found that long-dis-
tance freight rates in Tanzania are three times higher than in Indonesia.
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Figure 5. Transport Costs in Typical Sub-Saharan African and Asian Countries
Source: Starkey and others (2002).
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cheap irrigation. As a result, Africa has the lowest share of irrigated crop-
land of any major region of the developing world.16 Moreover, rainfall in
much of the continent is erratic, vulnerable to high seasonal and year-to-
year fluctuations, and the land is subject to high rates of evapotranspira-
tion, due also to high temperatures. Indeed, of all major regions, Africa
loses the largest share of its precipitation to evapotranspiration.17 In addi-
tion, rainfall in the Sahel (the semiarid region just south of the Sahara) has
been persistently low during the past thirty years, in a phenomenon that
may be linked to long-term climate change and to rising sea-surface tem-
peratures in the Indian Ocean. High transport costs also mean that African
farmers can afford little fertilizer, since by the time they cover the cost of
bringing fertilizer to their farms and farm output to market, fertilizers are
no longer cost effective. Consequently, farmers are farming on soils
increasingly depleted of nutrients, and without modern methods of water
management, in increasingly densely populated communities that are there-
fore too impoverished to ﬁnance roads and water infrastructure that could
dramatically raise farm yields. Finally, as discussed below, the new seed
varieties that sparked the Green Revolution in Asia and Latin America are
poorly suited to African farming conditions.
Very High Disease Burden
Africa carries a disease burden that is unique in the world in its severity.
In recent years the most prominent disease in the region has been HIV/
AIDS. Tropical sub-Saharan Africa’s HIV prevalence in 2001 was 7.3 per-
cent; in every other world region it is below 1 percent. Africa is also home
to numerous endemic tropical diseases, especially vector-borne diseases.
Among these, malaria is by far the most consequential. Of the 1 million to
3 million malaria-related deaths every year, it is estimated that 90 percent
occur in sub-Saharan Africa, the great majority of them among children.18
Many casual observers mistakenly assume that because the United States
and Europe once were burdened by malaria and got rid of it, Africa’s
ongoing malaria crisis is a symptom of its poverty and weak institutions
rather than a deep cause. In other words, many ask how malaria could have
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16. World Bank (2003a).
17. Global Environmental Monitoring and Research Center (1995).
18. World Health Organization and United Nations Children’s Fund (2003). 
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ment than it did in the southern United States, southern Europe, and other
regions that have since eliminated the disease. The answer lies in the
disease’s ecology.
Africa’s malaria is much less tractable than that in other regions for a
combination of climatic and biological reasons. The continent’s tempera-
tures, mosquito species, and humidity give Africa the world’s highest
malaria burden, as captured in the malaria ecology index developed by
Anthony Kiszewski, Jeffrey Sachs, and others; this index is a measure
of the strength of malarial transmission based solely on ecological fac-
tors.19 Unlike in other parts of the world, Africa’s malaria mosquitoes
are almost exclusively human-biters, and this fact enhances the chain of
human-to-human transmission. Africa is also the only major world region
where the most malignant human malaria species, Plasmodium falci-
parum, predominates.20 The combination of high year-round tempera-
tures, adequate precipitation for mosquito breeding, and human-biting
anopheles mosquitoes has made Africa the global epicenter of malaria
from time immemorial. The genetic code of African populations provides
evidence: the sickle-cell hemoglobin allele, which partially protects indi-
viduals against malaria when inherited heterozygously, is extraordinarily
prevalent in Africa compared with other regions of the world.21
Malaria contributes to a classic poverty trap. With enough invest-
ment, even Africa’s high malaria morbidity and mortality could be con-
trolled, although not eliminated, with current technologies. But that would
require substantially more money than Africa can afford. Thus Africa is
too poor to control malaria, and meanwhile malaria reduces productivity,
frustrates foreign investment, and (by contributing to very high child mor-
tality rates) delays or stops the demographic transition, thereby helping to
keep Africa poor.
To highlight Africa’s unique challenges in terms of high transport
costs, low agricultural productivity, and high disease burden, table 4 pre-
sents difference-of-means tests for a series of geographic variables and
results of simple regressions with agricultural productivity, infrastructure,
134 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
19. Kiszewski and others (2004). 
20. World Health Organization (1992).
21. The Hardy-Weinberg equation can be used to link the high prevalence of the hemo-
globin S allele and the historically high death rates from malaria in Africa. 
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Table 4. Selected Geographic and Health Indicators for 
Tropical Sub-Saharan Africa
Percent except where stated otherwise
Tropical Rest of Level of
sub-Saharan developing  statistical 
Indicator Africaa world averageb signiﬁcancec
Population distribution
Share of population  24.9 66.3 1 percent
within 100 kilometers of coast
Share of population in  62.0 34.9 1 percent
tropical ecozones
Share of population in subhumid and  81.9 38.7 1 percent
arid ecozones
Share of population living at low  45.2 26.5 1 percent
densityd
Agriculture
Irrigated land as share of total  0.5 10.6 1 percent
agricultural land
Cereal yield (kilograms per hectare) 1,102.0 2,364.6 1 percent
Fertilizer consumption (100 grams per  95.0 1,606.2 1 percent
hectare of arable land)
Infrastructure
Paved roads (kilometers per 1,000  <0.1 4.2 Not 
population) signiﬁcant
Traditional fuel use as  76.3 29.2 1 percent
share of total energy usee
Health
Index of malaria ecologyf 13.0 2.5 1 percent
Infant mortality rate  107.6 43.7 5 percent
(deaths per 1,000 live births)
Under-ﬁve mortality rate  176.9 58.1 1 percent
(deaths per 1,000 live births)
Total fertility rate (number of children)g 5.4 3.4 5 percent
Sources: World Bank (2003a); Center for International Earth Science Information Network, Columbia University (2002);
Kiszewski and others (2004); and authors’ regressions.
a. Thirty-three countries listed in table 2. Data are averages not weighted by population.
b. Former republics of the Soviet Union are excluded. Data are averages not weighted by population.
c. For the population distribution variables, statistical signiﬁcance of the difference in the two averages; for other variables,
statistical signiﬁcance of the dummy variable in the following regression:
dependent variable  = a +  b1 (log of 2001 GDP per capita at PPP) + b2 (dummy variable for tropical sub-Saharan Africa).
A tobit regression is used when the dependent variable is a percentage; otherwise ordinary least squares is used, with the depen-
dent variable expressed as a natural logarithm.
d. Percent of the population living in areas with density below 50 persons per square kilometer.
e. Estimated consumption of fuel wood, charcoal, bagasse (sugar cane waste), and animal and vegetable wastes.
f. From Kiszewski and others (2004). Index measures the stability of malaria transmission based on ecological factors and the
biological properties of the anopheline (mosquito) species of that region. The variable is measured at a highly disaggregated level
and averaged to the country level using population weighting.
g. Number of children that a woman would have borne if she survived her childbearing years and bore children in accordance
with age-speciﬁc fertility rates. 
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show a statistically signiﬁcant difference of means between sub-Saharan
Africa and the rest of the developing world, and the agriculture, infra-
structure, and health variables are signiﬁcantly worse in Africa even after
controlling for income per capita.
Adverse Geopolitics
On top of the structural challenges already mentioned, Africa suffered
brutally at the hands of European powers for almost five centuries, and
the record with Arab powers was little better. A massive slave trade
helped undermine the formation of nation-states and may have depopu-
lated Africa’s coastal regions. In the nineteenth century the slave trade
was replaced by direct colonial rule and a century of exploitation by Euro-
pean imperial powers. At the end of the colonial period, most of Africa
was left with tragically little infrastructure and education, far less than in
postcolonial Asia.22 In contrast to much of Asia, Africa’s borders were
drawn up without regard to ethnic and political units, with little infra-
structure connecting them. In addition, differences in colonial languages
and customs further fragmented many parts of Africa, particularly in West
Africa. Independence, ironically, was followed by the continued manipu-
lation of African countries as proxies in the cold war and continued depre-
dations by rich countries in exploiting Africa’s natural resources. No doubt
many African leaders played into these abuses and exacerbated them
through corrupt and authoritarian rule, but if it is true that these leaders
hanged themselves and their fellow citizens, the rich countries often pro-
vided the rope.
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22. It is worth quoting at length an excellent paper by Torero and Chowdhury (2004,
p. 4): “Unlike Asia and Latin America, Africa inherited a highly dispersed and unevenly
distributed infrastructure from its colonial past. There was little, if any, improvement of
infrastructure during the colonial era, and, according to [Baland and] Platteau (1996), ‘in
some important respects, it can even be said that colonial policy reinforced the handicaps of
SSA’ (p. 200). The limited infrastructure that was built during that era was driven by the
objective of connecting natural resources to export markets. For example, Platteau noted
that ‘two-thirds of the African railways built in the colonial period connected mines to a
coastal harbor’ (p. 200). The rest of the continent was virtually ignored and, according to
Boserup (1981), ‘only the Union of South Africa with mass immigration of Europeans had
more than six meters of railways per square kilometer in 1970 and six countries had no rail-
ways at all’ (p. 148).”
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rarely helping it, or at least not very much. Africa is not a strategic focus
of either the United States or Europe, in contradistinction, for example,
to the United States’ relationships with East Asia, the Middle East, or
Latin America, and Western Europe’s relationships with Eastern
Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is too far
away and too negligible a market to elicit a priority concern. The result is
that whereas Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East have all,
at times, been the object of U.S. ﬁnancial largesse, Africa has not. Africa
has also ranked as a low priority in both trade and debt negotiations. Fol-
lowing the 1982 developing country debt crisis, Latin American coun-
tries received debt cancellation well before Africa did, and trade
discrimination against Africa has persisted for decades despite repeated
promises to remove limits on Africa’s access to U.S. and European mar-
kets. Even new initiatives to expand access to the U.S. market, such as
the African Growth and Opportunity Act, remain heavily constrained by
rules-of-origin and other limits to African exports.
Slow Diffusion of Technology from Abroad
Africa has been the world’s great laggard in technological advance,
notably in the areas of agriculture and health. For instance, most of the devel-
oping world experienced a Green Revolution—a surge in crop yields in
the 1970s through the 1990s as a result of scientific breeding that pro-
duced high-yield varieties (HYVs), combined with increased use of fer-
tilizers and irrigation. Africa’s uptake of HYVs was the lowest in the
developing world. The reasons are very clear. The Green Revolution HYVs
were designed for the conditions of Latin America and Asia and did not
easily transfer to the agronomic and economic conditions of Africa’s rain-
fed, fertilizer-scarce, subhumid and arid tropics. Whereas HYV research
focused mainly on wheat, maize, and paddy rice, Africa produces maize
but little wheat and paddy rice. It depends much more on sorghum, millet,
and tubers (cassava, coco yams, and sweet potatoes). As discussed
above, high transport costs and the combination of unfavorable geohy-
drology and topography hindered increases in the use of fertilizers and
irrigation. The absence of a Green Revolution in Africa had clear impli-
cations for food productivity, as shown in table 5. Sub-Saharan Africa has
by far the lowest cereal yield per hectare of any major region and has
Sachs, McArthur, Schmidt-Traub, Kruk, Bahadur, Faye, and McCord 137



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  138experienced the slowest gain in yields during the last two decades. Indeed, it
is the only major region to have recorded a (slight) decline in food pro-
duction per capita during 1980–2000.
In highlighting these points, we are certainly not arguing for any 
geographical determinism. Indeed, the whole point of the paper is the
opposite: Africa’s structural impediments can be overcome, if they are
compensated by an intensive investment program that directly confronts
the continent’s high transport costs, low agricultural productivity, heavy
disease burden, colonial legacy of poor educational attainment, and the
like. We are arguing, however, that Africa’s structural problems help to
account for its current trap. Each of the factors mentioned has made it
much harder for Africa to lift itself up by its bootstraps. Rural and inland
Africa, plagued by disease, huge transport costs, and low agricultural yields,
was unable to generate enough of an economic surplus above survival
levels that could be invested sufficiently to overcome these conditions.
Poor governance no doubt complicated the task—many natural resource
rents were squandered—but the poor governance itself was as much symp-
tom as cause.23 To break out of the poverty trap, Africa needs help, and it
has not yet gotten it in the form and to the extent that is necessary.
The delay in getting this help, moreover, has greatly complicated the
task that lies ahead. Because the world has waited so long to help Africa
break free of its structural constraints, the situation is vastly more compli-
cated today than even a generation ago. First, there is AIDS, a pandemic
unrivaled in ferocity in modern history, which the rich countries have
allowed to run almost unabated in Africa since its recognition twenty-
three years ago. Second, the massive population growth in rural areas has
led to a sharp fall in the size of the average household farm. In turn, the
increased population pressure has not led to agricultural intensiﬁcation as
Ester Boserup predicted,24 but has caused massive environmental degra-
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23. Even in clear cases of squandered wealth, such as Nigeria with its oil earnings, the
extent of the loss is often exaggerated. Nigeria is not, contrary to popular view, a rich coun-
try that squandered vast wealth. Rather, it is a poor country that squandered a modest inher-
itance. A simple calculation explains why. Nigeria produces around 2 million barrels of oil
a day, at a price of roughly $25 per barrel in recent years, or $50 million a day. Perhaps
60 percent of this, or $30 million a day, stays with Nigeria after production sharing with
foreign companies and covering the costs of extraction. Given that there are approximately
130 million Nigerians, oil revenue would be around 23 cents per Nigerian per day, or
around $84 a year. Nigeria, in short, is not oil rich on a per capita basis. 
24. Boserup (1965).
2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  139dation instead. In Boserup’s theory, higher population density should have
led to intensive cultivation, with large investments in fertilizers, water
management, seed breeding, and the like. Instead soil nutrients have been
depleted, with hardly any replacement by chemical fertilizers or nitrogen-
fixing plants, and forests have been cut down, yet food production remains
at subsistence levels, with almost no modern inputs.
Some Growth Accounting
Africa’s poverty trap is evident empirically through simple growth
accounting. We look at this in two ways. The ﬁrst is the standard Solow
decomposition of growth, as recently implemented on a cross-country
basis by Barry Bosworth and Susan Collins.25 The second is the AK
140 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
25. Bosworth and Collins (2003).
Table 6. Decomposition of Growth by Region, 1980–90 and 1990–2000
Contribution to growth in output 
Growth in output 
per worker (percentage points)
per worker  Physical capital  Education Total factor
Region and period (percent a year) per worker per worker productivity
Africaa
1980–90 –1.1 –0.1 0.4 –1.4
1990–2000 –0.2 –0.1 0.4 –0.5
Latin America
1980–90 –1.8 0.0 0.5 –2.3
1990–2000 0.9 0.2 0.3 0.4
Middle East
1980–90 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.1
1990–2000 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.0
East Asia
1980–90 4.4 2.4 0.6 1.3
1990–2000 3.4 2.3 0.5 0.5
China
1980–90 6.8 2.1 0.4 4.2
1990–2000 8.8 3.2 0.3 5.1
Industrial countries
1980–90 1.8 0.7 0.2 0.9
1990–2000 1.5 0.8 0.2 0.5
Source: Bosworth and Collins (2003). 
a. Nineteen African countries with populations above 1 million for which data were available.
2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  140model approach, which assumes a ﬁxed incremental capital-labor ratio
and which does not require us to construct a capital stock. Both methods
give the same result: Africa has not been saving enough to keep up with
the requirements of capital widening. The Bosworth-Collins decomposi-
tion is shown in table 6. We see that Africa is the only region to have
experienced two consecutive decades of declining output per worker.
According to Bosworth and Collins, Africa’s shortfall is the result of both
a declining capital-worker ratio and an outright decline in total factor pro-
ductivity (which could reﬂect, for example, the effects of environmental
degradation, not measured in the capital stock, on crop yields).26
The implementation of the AK model for the period 1980–2001 is
shown in table 7. There we assume that A = 1/3, or an incremental capital-
output ratio of 3, which is a typical estimate in the development litera-
ture.27 According to the AK model, and ignoring growth in total factor
productivity, we should expect the growth rate to equal sA − (n + d). With
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26. Bosworth and Collins (2003).
27. Note that A is the ratio of Y to K, so that 1/A is the ratio of K to Y. Kuznets (1966),
for example, assumes K/Y = 3 in his discussion of saving, investment, and growth. The
unweighted average value of K/Y in the Bosworth-Collins data for African countries in
2000 is around 2.5. 
Table 7. Economic Growth Predicted from National Saving, Population Growth,
and Capital Consumption, by Developing Region, 1980–2001
Percenta
Gross Consumption
national of ﬁxed 
saving as capital as
share of share of  
gross gross 
national Growth in national 
Region incomea populationa incomea Predicted Actual 
Tropical sub-Saharan  11.1 2.7 9.9 –2.3 –0.4
Africab
South Asia 20.0 2.0 8.7 1.8 3.3
Latin America 18.7 1.8 9.8 1.2 0.4
East Asia and  35.1 1.3 9.6 7.2 6.4
Paciﬁc
Middle East and  23.5 2.4 9.2 2.3 1.0
North Africa
Source: Authors’ calculations using data from World Bank (2003a).
a. Annual average across countries and years, weighted by population. 
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Figure 6. Growth in Gross National Income by Developing Region, 
Actual and Predicted, 1980–2001
Source: World Bank (2003a) and authors’ calculations using model described in the text.
A = 1/3, s equal to the national saving rate, n equal to the population
growth rate, and d equal to capital consumption as a percentage of GNP
divided by 3 (to give an estimate of capital consumption as a share of the
capital stock), we see that Africa is indeed predicted by the simple AK
model to have a negative growth rate. The combination of Africa’s low
domestic saving rate and high population growth rate is just as we
expected. In fact, the AK model does remarkably well in accounting for
the variation across the ﬁve regions in growth in income per capita, as
shown by ﬁgure 6.
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income accounts data almost surely, and substantially, overestimate Africa’s
true saving rate. To a significant extent, Africa is living off of its natural
capital but counting the resource depletion as income. Africa has been
cutting down its rainforests to make room for new farmland and to pro-
vide fuel wood and timber, but the deforestation is not counted as a loss
of natural capital. Farmers have been depleting the soils of nutrients 
by growing crops without fertilizers, but the loss of soil nutrients is not
counted as a loss of capital. Countries depleting their mineral reserves
(for example, Zambia’s copper) are counted as earning income rather than
converting one form of capital, mineral deposits, to another, financial
assets. Sooner or later these forms of resource depletion will have to come
to an end, and African real consumption will fall, perhaps significantly.
Put differently, Africa’s productive capital stock per person is falling even
faster than was suspected once we take into account, even imperfectly, the
decline of a number of forms of natural capital.
There is no readily accepted practical methodology for correcting mea-
sured national saving rates for resource depletion effects. We therefore
use the World Bank’s valiant, but very preliminary, attempt, adding in
one calculation of our own.28 In the World Bank’s corrected saving mea-
sures, the saving rate taken from the national accounts is augmented by
expenditure on education (which is counted as consumption in the
national accounts but should be counted as investment in human capital),
and then reduced according to estimates of the economic costs of defor-
estation, energy depletion, and mineral depletion. This corrected saving
rate is shown in the right-hand column of table 8. We then make one more
correction for tropical sub-Saharan Africa, by measuring the estimated
annual loss to Africa’s soil of three macronutrients—nitrogen, phospho-
rus, and potassium—which are currently being depleted with each har-
vest. Sooner rather than later, this loss of soil nutrients will have to be
made up by the addition of nutrients through chemical or biological
means. If we assume that the soil nutrients are replaced through inputs of
chemical fertilizers purchased at market value in Africa, the annual cost
of replacing the soil nutrients is around 2 percent of Africa’s gross
national income (GNI). We accordingly lower the measured saving rate
by that amount. In sum, whereas Africa’s measured national saving rate is
Sachs, McArthur, Schmidt-Traub, Kruk, Bahadur, Faye, and McCord 143
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tion might be only around 1.0 percent of GNI. Whatever the precise num-
ber, the conclusion is that Africa is failing to maintain its capital-labor
ratio.
A Big Push to End Africa’s Poverty Trap
If Africa is caught below kT, and therefore is stuck in chronic low or
negative growth, the main policy implication is to raise k above kT, which
in turn would unleash self-sustaining growth by raising A and s and low-
ering n. We propose to increase the capital stock in one step, as it were,
through a large, well-targeted infusion of foreign assistance. In other words,
we are arguing not for endless flows of increased aid, and not for aid as
simple charity, but rather for increased aid as an exit strategy from the
poverty trap. For those who fear that aid increases dependency, our re-
sponse is that aid that is ambitious enough would actually end Africa’s
dependency. Moreover, we see no other likely successful strategy for ending
Africa’s poverty trap.
In the short run we think of aid as augmenting national saving by a
flow of external saving, so that the growth equation becomes (s + a)A −
(n + d), where a is ofﬁcial development assistance as a share of national
income of the recipient economy. In our proposal this flow of aid is tar-
geted to a particular set of priority investments, and specifically public
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Table 8. Gross National Saving Rates by Developing Region, 1980–2001
Percent of gross national income
Adjusted for human
capital investment and
Region Unadjusted resource depletiona
Tropical sub-Saharan Africab 11.1 3.0 (1.0)c
South Asia 20.0 18.7
Latin America 18.7 15.7
East Asia and the Paciﬁc 35.1 29.3
Middle East and North Africa 23.5 9.1
Sources: World Bank (2003a) and authors’ calculations using data from Henao and Baanante (1999) and African Agricultural
Market Information Network data base, accessed at www.afamin.net/regionalenglish/reg_mis_en.asp on March 8, 2004.
a. Gross national saving plus education expenditure, minus energy, mineral, and net forest depletion. 
b. Thirty-three-country sample listed in table 2. Averages are weighted by population.
c. When soil nutrient depletion is calculated with the 1999 sub-Saharan Africa nutrient balance midpoint of 60–100 kilograms
of nutrients (nitrogen, phosphorus, potassium) per hectare, the result is the ﬁrst ﬁgure shown. When nutrient depletion indicators
and fertilizer prices are used to calculate soil depletion (around 2 percent of GDP), adjusted gross saving is reduced to 1.5 percent
of gross national income, and adjusted net saving is the ﬁgure in parentheses.
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recipient country would commit to use the aid not to replace but rather
to augment existing spending in the targeted areas. We believe that, with
some care in designing the donor-recipient process, such a commitment
can be enforceable through improved monitoring of budget processes and
expenditures, perhaps with the help of local nongovernmental organiza-
tions. The results of debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
initiative, in which the fiscal resources made available by reduced debt
servicing were similarly targeted at predetermined areas of public spend-
ing (especially social spending), have been highly encouraging. In fact,
the fear that increased aid would simply allow the recipient country to
decrease its own efforts is not a major concern in our view, because the
rates of domestic public investment in the targeted areas are already so
low that there is in fact little to substitute for. Of course, a reasonable
level of governance in the recipient country is a necessary precondition
for this process to work.
If aid is to end the poverty trap, it must be large enough and maintained
long enough to raise k above kT. Small or short-lived ﬂows of aid will
accomplish little, since they, too, will be overwhelmed by rapid popula-
tion growth, so that (s + a)A − (n + d) will remain negative. This basic
point is important and widely misunderstood. It is often said that past aid
to Africa has little to show for it. In fact, there has been too little aid to
make a difference. Moreover, the aid has been very poorly targeted mainly
toward the donors’ foreign policy clients (such as President Mobuto Sese
Seko of Zaire) rather than development purposes.
To use a simple analogy, consider a large forest ﬁre with a tendency to
spread. Suppose that only one ﬁreman is initially sent to ﬁght the blaze,
and he is overwhelmed. The critics might then say, “Why should we send
more ﬁremen? We’ve already seen that they are ineffective!” In dealing
with the control of any epidemic process, a proper scale of intervention is
needed. Similarly, aid has to be large enough to ensure that (s + a)A is in
fact raised above n + d. The effectiveness of aid has been demonstrated in
several well-governed African countries. For example, Mozambique has
effectively used comparatively generous aid receipts of roughly $50 per
capita to finance infrastructure investments, the provision of social ser-
vices, and the demobilization of the armed forces.29 In Tanzania progress
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high aid disbursements during the 1980s and early 1990s.30
Any aid strategy must confront many complexities, especially regarding
the conditions under which aid is provided. Unconstrained aid ﬂows would
probably be consumed rather than invested. The strategy needs to be
designed to ensure that the aid is properly invested, and there must be a
credible mechanism for enforcing the strategy over a relatively long period.
We ﬁrst take up the design of the investment program and then, in the ﬁnal
section of the paper, consider the recipient-donor enforcement mechanisms.
Our specific recommendation is to use the Millennium Development
Goals for 2015 as the intermediate targets for the investment program. In
other words, we argue that aid flows should be designed to enable other-
wise well-governed African countries to meet the MDGs. There are both
pragmatic and substantive reasons for this choice. The pragmatic reason
is that the world has already promised to do just this. The MDGs are the
only international goals that can motivate a complicated international
machinery of intergovernmental cooperation and resource transfers. But
there are deeper reasons as well. The MDGs in fact constitute a very rea-
sonable balance of concerns and are the product of a decade or more of
international debate and deliberation on economic development. They
reﬂect the fact, for example, that the escape from poverty requires invest-
ments in both human capital and physical capital, and that poverty itself is
multidimensional, involving not only income but also lack of food secu-
rity, health, education, gender equality, environmental management, and
access to basic amenities. The MDGs are also ﬂexible enough to support
a well-constructed growth strategy. For example, they call for halving the
rate of income poverty by 2015, but they do not specify exactly how this
is to be done. That leaves open the possibility for sound analysis of the
underlying growth dynamics and allows investment targets to be intro-
duced in several areas (such as family planning, energy systems, and rural
roads) that the MDGs do not explicitly mention, but that are nonetheless
key inputs to a sound public investment strategy to end the poverty trap.
One final preliminary thought is important. The MDGs are an inter-
mediate target, not a final goal. After all, even if met, they will still leave
in place an enormous amount of extreme poverty. Indeed, it is quite likely
that, whatever is achieved in terms of the MDGs, many African coun-
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more beyond 2015, since they will not have reached the threshold for self-
sustaining growth. We are not arguing that the MDGs are sufficient for
escaping poverty. We are arguing that they are a sensible, internationally
agreed way station on the road to eliminating extreme poverty and ending
Africa’s poverty trap.
Designing a Strategy to Meet the MDGs
Ending the poverty trap in Africa and meeting the MDGs will require 
a comprehensive strategy for public investment in conjunction with im-
proved governance. This section lays out such an investment strategy
focusing on speciﬁc interventions—deﬁned broadly as the provision of
goods, services, and infrastructure—which we have grouped into seven
areas in appendix A. A detailed background paper of the UN Millennium
Project offers more information on both the general strategy and the vari-
ous sets of interventions.31
Most of the interventions are expected to have effects on several goals.
For example, improved education leads to many beneﬁts, including reduc-
tions in income poverty, hunger, and child mortality. Conversely, meeting
each goal (poverty, hunger, education, health, and the others) requires
multiple interventions. This point is stressed in appendix B, which sum-
marizes how each goal is affected by multiple sets of interventions. The
combination of appendixes A and B approximates an “MDG production
function,” describing the set of inputs needed to achieve the desired set
of outputs. Of course, this is a purely qualitative depiction at this stage;
we provide a quantiﬁcation of the inputs in the later analysis.
In designing the recommended package, we have given careful consid-
eration to the issue of gender equity, that is, to an improved economic and
social status for Africa’s women. To a great extent, women are the farm-
ers, caregivers, and child raisers of Africa. They perform an incredible
amount of physical labor every day merely to keep their households alive.
Fetching fuel wood and water, caring for the farm animals, plowing the
fields, and caring for the sick and dying in the AIDS pandemic are all
backbreaking tasks disproportionately borne by Africa’s women. Many
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Share of  total Share of
poor employ- population
living ment  in  in  urban
in rural agriculture, areas
Country National Rural Urban areasa,b 1990 1990
Angola n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 74.5 33.5
Benin 33.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 63.5 41.5
Burkina Faso 45.3 51.0 16.5 94.3 92.4 16.2
Burundi 36.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 8.6
Cameroon n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 69.7 48.0
Central n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 80.2 40.8
African Rep.
Chad 64.0 67.0 63.0 80.1 83.2 23.5
Congo, Dem.  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 67.8 n.a.
Rep. of
Congo, Rep. of n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 48.7 64.5
Côte d’Ivoire 36.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 60.0 43.2
Eritrea 53.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 80.5 18.4
Ethiopia 44.2 45.0 37.0 86.3 n.a. 15.2
Ghana 31.4 34.3 26.7 70.1 n.a. 35.8
Guinea 40.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 87.2 27.1
Kenya 42.0 46.4 29.3 74.8 19.1 32.3
Liberia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 72.3 44.3
Madagascar 71.3 76.7 52.1 76.5 78.2 28.8
Malawi 65.3 66.5 54.9 87.2 n.a. 14.4
Mali n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 85.8 29.5
Mauritania 46.3 61.2 25.4 57.7 55.2 56.3
Mozambique 69.4 71.3 62.0 71.1 82.7 30.8
Niger 63.0 66.0 52.0 83.7 7.8 20.1
Nigeria 34.1 36.4 30.4 60.7 n.a. 43.1
Rwanda 51.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 91.7 6.1
Senegal 33.4 40.4 n.a. 64.6 76.7 46.7
Sierra Leone n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 67.4 35.9
Somalia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 75.3 27.1
Sudan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 69.5 35.1
Tanzania 41.6 49.7 24.4 82.3 n.a. 31.1
Togo n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 65.5 32.8
Uganda 55.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.8
Zambia 72.9 83.1 56.0 68.9 74.7 39.5
Zimbabwe 34.9 48.0 7.9 90.0 24.3 34.6
All tropical  48.4 56.2 38.4 76.6 67.5 31.8
sub-Saharan
Africa
Source: World Bank (2003a) and authors’ calculations.
a. Data are for the most recent year between 1990 and 2001 for which data are available.
b. Calculated as rural poverty rate × (100 – urbanization rate)/national poverty rate.
Poverty ratea
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ply, modern cooking fuels, enhanced transport services, and improved soil
nutrients, will have a special beneﬁt for women.
The first area of interventions focuses on raising rural productivity,
because three-quarters of Africa’s poor live in rural areas, and an over-
whelming percentage are employed in agriculture, as shown in table 9. In
particular, the investments in farm productivity will increase rural incomes
and reduce chronic hunger, which in Africa is predominantly caused by
insufﬁcient agricultural productivity. Additional interventions for roads,
power, improved cooking fuels and stoves, and water and sanitation will
provide a basis for higher productive efﬁciency.
The second area addresses Africa’s extraordinary disease burden, wide-
spread micronutrient deficiencies, and extremely high fertility rates by
focusing on health, nutrition, and family planning. This package of inter-
ventions includes the medical interventions needed to improve child and
maternal health; prevent the transmission of and provide treatment for
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria; improve nutrition; and provide fam-
ily planning services. We include an entire package of family planning
and reproductive health services, aimed at enabling a signiﬁcant reduction
in Africa’s very high total fertility rates. We believe that access to family
planning, contraceptive services, girls’ education, women’s empowerment,
and off-farm employment opportunities for young women can lead to a
dramatic reduction in the total fertility rate in just a few years.
The third area of interventions aims for universal completion of primary
education. In designing this package of interventions, particular attention
needs to be paid to increasing girls’ completion rates through additional
demand-side interventions such as incentive payments to poor households
to encourage them to keep their daughters in school. We also argue that
secondary school enrollment needs to be increased, because the returns to
education now and especially in the future will increasingly depend on sec-
ondary education. Moreover, large numbers of secondary school graduates
will be required to help deliver the other MDG intervention packages; for
example, secondary school graduates will be needed as community health
workers and agricultural extension workers. Targeted adult literacy pro-
grams that are designed to raise educational attainment among the adult
population will complete the investments in human capital.
The fourth area of interventions addresses challenges specific to urban
areas. Throughout sub-Saharan Africa the large cities have not yet gener-
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tries. In conjunction with abject rural poverty, which fuels rural-urban
migration, the lack of urban jobs has led to extremely high levels of urban
poverty, which are rising across much of the continent. An MDG-based
urban strategy focuses on urban infrastructure and services (electricity,
transport, water and sanitation, waste disposal, and so forth) and slum
upgrading. Successful urban development and the creation of viable
export industries across Africa are contingent on improving access to rich
countries’ markets, particularly for apparel and light manufacturing, and
the ﬂexibility to use targeted industrial policies as needed.
The ﬁfth area of interventions focuses on the mobilization of science
and technology. Currently, tropical sub-Saharan Africa produces roughly
twenty times fewer patents per capita than the average for the rest of the
developing world, and the region has only 18 scientists and engineers per
million population, compared with 69 in South Asia, 76 in the Middle
East, 273 in Latin America, and 903 in East Asia. We stress the need for
increased investment in science advising, higher education, and research
and development targeted at Africa’s specific ecological challenges in
food production, disease, nutrition, construction, energy, and other areas.
The sixth area focuses speciﬁcally on interventions for achieving gen-
der equity that are not included as part of the other intervention areas. This
includes ensuring full reproductive health rights and access to services, as
well as the guarantee of equal property rights and access to work, backed
up by afﬁrmative action to increase political representation. Of particular
concern in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa are persistently high levels
of violence against women and girls; this violence needs to be confronted
with legislative and administrative changes.
The seventh area of interventions focuses on regional integration as a
sine qua non for economic growth. The ﬁfteen of the forty-nine countries
in sub-Saharan Africa that are landlocked have little chance to develop un-
less they have ready access to the coast with efﬁcient, low-cost infrastructure.
Moreover, from a global perspective, the African countries taken individ-
ually are very small markets. Regional integration will raise the interest
of potential foreign investors by increasing the scope of the market that
accompanies an operating presence in Africa. Regional integration is also
important in achieving scale economies in infrastructure networks, such
as power grids, large-scale electricity generation, road transport, rails, and
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specific to Africa’s ecology but that extend beyond any single country,
such as public health, energy systems, and agronomy.
As an overarching matter affecting each of these seven categories of
interventions, we note that Africa will require large numbers of teachers,
nurses, doctors, agricultural extension ofﬁcers, infrastructure specialists,
scientists, and so forth—experts who are in very short supply across the
continent. Hence each of the seven investment areas relies on a substantial
scaling up of specialized human resources. In addition to expanding for-
mal higher education, therefore, African countries need to focus on voca-
tional training and short-term training courses. Already several countries
have demonstrated that community health workers or agricultural exten-
sion officers who have undergone one-year training courses can produce
substantial improvements in the communities where they work. For exam-
ple, Ethiopia is currently training several thousand community health work-
ers who will be able to carry out malaria control, offer simple treatment,
and help improve households’ hygiene. If extended to other areas, this
“barefoot doctor” approach could rapidly improve rural life at moderate
cost. An additional advantage from the countries’ perspective is that these
vocationally trained experts are less likely to migrate abroad than their
more highly trained colleagues.
Speciﬁc Interventions to Achieve the MDGs
A full discussion of these proposed interventions is far beyond the
scope of this paper but is available from the UN Millennium Project.32
For purposes of illustration we describe here only two categories of
interventions: investments in rural productivity and in reducing child
mortality. Our aim is to show that speciﬁc investments exist that could
make enormous changes in productivity at rather low cost.
increasing rural productivity. As already mentioned, sub-Saharan
Africa is the world’s only major region where food output per capita has
been stagnant since 1980.33 Reversing this trend lies at the heart of any
strategy to achieve the MDGs in Africa. One key factor in this stagnation
is the declining availability of arable land per capita, which has shrunk
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because of population growth. Table 10 shows the tremendous decreases
in land under crop cultivation relative to population in agriculture in
several African countries since 1960.35
Overcoming the fall in average farm size and availability per capita of
arable land requires increased food productivity coupled with a reduction
in the growth rate of the rural population. In general, ﬁve sets of con-
straints must be addressed to increase African food productivity. First, soil
fertility in Africa is low and has been declining. This is due to several fac-
tors: lack of available soil nutrients (such as nitrogen, phosphorus, sulfur,
magnesium, and zinc), insufﬁcient soil organic matter, poor physical struc-
ture of the soil, poor water-holding capacity, high risk of erosion, limited
rooting depth, and lack of biodiversity.36 Second, smallholder farmers in
Africa lack access to improved seeds that are suited to their soils. Third,
limited water availability and increasingly variable precipitation patterns
pose major challenges for smallholder water management and irrigation.37
Fourth, knowledge concerning new technologies that can increase crop
yields is extremely limited. Fifth, women typically conduct the majority of
African farm work, but they frequently have limited access to farm prop-
152 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
34. Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical, Tropical Soil Biology and Fertility,
and International Center for Research in Agroforestry (2002). 
35. Jayne and others (2001). 
36. Donovan and Casey (1998).
37. According to data from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), sub-Saharan
Africa includes eleven of the sixteen nations of the world that receive less than 1,000 cubic
meters of water per hectare—a situation described as “absolute water scarcity” (FAO,
1995a). 
Table 10. Land under Cultivation in Selected Sub-Saharan 
African Countries, 1960–99a
Hectares per capita
Country 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99
Ethiopia 0.508 0.450 0.363 0.252
Kenya 0.459 0.350 0.280 0.229
Mozambique 0.389 0.367 0.298 0.249
Rwanda 0.215 0.211 0.197 0.161
Zambia 1.367 1.073 0.896 0.779
Zimbabwe 0.726 0.664 0.583 0.525
Source: Jayne and others (2001).
a. Data are period averages.
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and have limited access to improved agricultural technologies.
These constraints on raising rural productivity can be overcome
through a series of well-targeted interventions. Soil nutrient deﬁciencies
can be addressed through chemical fertilizers that help to increase crop
yields and through agroforestry techniques that use nitrogen-ﬁxing
trees.38 One approach is to interplant such trees in young maize ﬁelds and
allow them to grow as fallows during dry seasons, accumulating 100 to
200 kilograms of nitrogen per hectare in six months to two years. In the
subhumid regions of eastern and southern Africa, this technology can
double or more the yields of maize, a staple crop.39 It can be supple-
mented with investments in improved seeds adapted to African farming
environments. Suitable seeds can raise yields, reduce the time to harvest,
improve germination, reduce labor requirements, reduce vulnerability to
diseases, and improve cooking, processing, and storage qualities.
To improve crop irrigation in the arid and subhumid regions where
most Africans live, it is generally acknowledged that small-scale and
technically simple water management systems are most appropriate
because of their low cost and ease of operation and maintenance. Options
include water harvesting through the use of embankments, check dams
and small impoundment dams, shallow wells, drip irrigation, and treadle
or diesel pumps. Experience in Burkina Faso, Kenya, and Sudan shows
that rain harvested from one hectare for supplementary irrigation of
another can triple or even quadruple production.40
These physical interventions need to be augmented by agricultural exten-
sion services that provide farmers with technical support and training.41
Although debate continues over the most appropriate model for extension
services, there is consensus on the need for increased human resources
and research programs, and particularly on the need to improve the tech-
nical qualiﬁcations of extension workers.42
Sachs, McArthur, Schmidt-Traub, Kruk, Bahadur, Faye, and McCord 153
38. Such trees include leguminous trees of the genera Sesbania, Tephrosia, Crotalaria,
and Glyricidia.
39. Sanchez (2002). 
40. FAO (1996). 
41. Birkhaeuser, Evenson, and Feder (1991). 
42. Sasakawa Africa Association (2000). The Green Revolution relied mainly on the
training and visitation (T&V) model, whereby extension served as a transmission belt
between research centers and farmers through cadres of ﬁeld-based, professional trainers.
However, this model had its limitations, including poor linkages of the research undertaken 
2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  153A central theme throughout the rural productivity strategy is the need for
special attention to the critical role that women play in African agriculture.
Africa’s women contribute 60 to 80 percent of the labor used to produce
food both for household consumption and for sale, yet they face enormous
cultural and legal inequities.43 Special interventions are needed to reach
them through extension services and to provide them with access to tech-
nologies and skills that they can use to reduce the time spent in the field
and increase production. Christopher Udry, John Hoddinott, and Lawrence
Haddad show that merely allocating factors of production evenly across
plots controlled by women and men could increase plot output by 10 to 15
percent.44
Interventions outside the formal agricultural sector are also crucial for
farm productivity. Not surprisingly, education is important. The Inter-
national Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimates, for example,
that an extra year of primary education provided to women farmers in
Kenya would increase maize yields by 24 percent.45 Transport infra-
structure and services are also critical, since well-maintained feeder,
district, and national roads are crucial in order to bring products to mar-
kets and to lower the costs of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer and
improved seeds. In one indication of the severity of rural farmer isola-
tion, John Hine and John Rutter estimate that, for 51 percent of villages in
Ghana and 60 percent of villages in Malawi, the walking distance to the
nearest pickup point for motorized transport services was more than
2 kilometers; it was over 10 kilometers for 10 percent of Ghanaian vil-
lages and 19 percent of Malawian villages.46 D. S. Spencer calculates
that, for tropical Africa to reach a road density (measured in kilometers
of roads per square kilometer of land) equivalent to that of India at the
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budgetary constraints and lack of long-term ﬁscal support. Increasingly, hybrid solutions
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would have to be increased by a factor of six.47
Often forgotten in the rural productivity equation are modern energy
services, and in particular safe thermal energy for cooking as well as elec-
tricity for illumination, water pumps, and refrigeration. In addition to pro-
viding health benefits through reduced indoor air pollution, improved
cooking stoves and fuels help to preserve biomass and dung for use as fer-
tilizer. Subsidized access to safe fuel sources such as liquid petroleum gas
also allows women to spend less time collecting biomass fuel and cooking
and more time tending to farm production and opportunities to generate
private income.
reducing child mortality. Table 1 showed how child mortality
rates in Africa are by far the worst in the world; a total of 4 million
African children under five die each year. Remarkably, five conditions
account for approximately 95 percent of these fatalities: one quarter result
from neonatal disorders (infections, birth asphyxia and injuries, and com-
plications of prematurity) that occur in the first twenty-eight days of life;
22 percent from malaria; 21 percent from pneumonia; 20 percent from
diarrheal diseases; and 8 percent from HIV/AIDS.48 Although these esti-
mates are imprecise because of the difficulty of attributing cause of death
and the dubious quality of the underlying data, the basic message is that
controlling a limited number of preventable and treatable conditions could
bring about a dramatic reduction in child mortality.
Underlying these proximate causes of death are contributing factors
that render children susceptible. Malnutrition, for example, is a contribut-
ing factor in at least half of all child deaths,49 because malnourished chil-
dren cannot resist common infections as readily as adequately nourished
children and, when infected, have a much higher risk of complications and
death. Even mildly underweight children are estimated to have a two-
fold higher risk of death than those that are adequately nourished.50 Mean-
while, poor indoor air quality and lack of access to drinking water and
sanitation predispose children to pneumonia and diarrhea.
Because the causes of child death are both direct and indirect, inter-
ventions focused on saving children’s lives need to both treat children
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ventions typically fall within the realm of the formal health sector, but pre-
ventive interventions necessarily span other sectors as well. Prominent
among health sector interventions to improve child health outcomes is an
integrated neonatal package that includes clean delivery, newborn resus-
citation, prevention of hypothermia, antibiotics for infection, tetanus tox-
oid, breastfeeding education, and community hygiene education.51 Such a
package may reduce neonatal mortality by up to 60 percent.52 Immuniza-
tions are another simple intervention with well-documented beneﬁts in
the early stages of life: vaccinations against major diseases such as polio,
diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, measles, hepatitis B, and yellow fever have
all been shown to reduce child mortality. Immunizing all children against
measles alone could save 2.3 million children in Africa within the current
decade.53
For children beyond infancy, a broad set of interventions has been estab-
lished under the UNICEF-WHO protocol known as the Integrated Manage-
ment of Childhood Illness (IMCI). This includes a series of preventive and
curative interventions that enable health workers to treat symptoms that
could have multiple underlying causes. Speciﬁc IMCI interventions include
insecticide-treated nets (ITNs) to prevent malaria; complementary feed-
ing;54 vaccinations; micronutrient supplementation; case management of
acute respiratory infections, diarrhea, measles, malaria, and malnutrition;
treatment with iron; and antihelminthic treatment.55 This protocol has been
applied successfully in dozens of developing countries. For example, early
results from Tanzania show a significantly reduced hospital admission
rate for children in IMCI districts.56
Interventions to prevent and treat malaria are part of IMCI but deserve
special elaboration in the African context. On the prevention side, ITNs
provide both a physical and a chemical barrier to the mosquitoes that
transmit malaria, with benefits extending beyond the individual user as
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quitoes in the vicinity. The impact of comprehensive ITN programs can
be substantial. A review evaluating twenty-two trials concluded that
approximately 6 lives could be saved for every 1,000 children protected
with ITNs.57 In Tanzania, C. A. Maxwell and colleagues found that ITNs
were linked to 55 to 75 percent reductions in malarial morbidity for
children aged six months to two years.58 On the treatment side, the recent
rise in malarial resistance to chloroquine and sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine
in Africa has accelerated the need to make the transition to more effec-
tive therapies such as artemisinin-based combination treatment.59 This
treatment can enhance clinical efficacy and delay the development of
resistance.60
Of course, interventions outside of the formal health sector are also
crucial for reducing child mortality, as described in appendix B. Targeted
nutritional interventions can help enormously. For example, a UN study
demonstrated that vitamin A supplementation resulted in a 23 percent
average reduction in mortality rates among infants and children between
six months and ﬁve years old.61 Substituting clean cooking fuels for
domestic biomass fuels has been estimated to reduce acute respiratory
infections in several developing countries by approximately 30 percent.62
D. Leipziger and colleagues, in a study of forty-three developing coun-
tries, estimated that improved access to water explains 37 percent of the
difference in child mortality between the poorest and richest quintiles
within countries.63 Simple hand washing with soap and water reduces
shigella and diarrheal disease transmission by 35 percent.64
Maternal education similarly contributes to child health. Each addi-
tional year of a mother’s education corresponds to an estimated 7 to 9 per-
cent decline in her under-five child’s mortality risk, although the precise
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traception can also have a strong impact on child mortality rates.
These interventions must be provided in an integrated manner, but one
must be careful not to think of their effects as purely additive. A critical
lesson from past experience with development programs in the health sec-
tor is that successful scale-up and utilization of a broad range of disease-
speciﬁc health interventions requires a functioning health system, including
an adequate complement of health workers; good management capacity
for supervision and oversight; ongoing monitoring, evaluation, and qual-
ity assurance; and sustained outreach and education for communities,
among other features.
In a prominent recent study, G. Jones and colleagues evaluated the
impact of a broad set of health sector and non-health sector interventions
on child survival and concluded that 63 percent of annual child deaths
could be prevented by providing universal (deﬁned as 99 percent) access
to an integrated set of interventions.66 Although these authors did not
evaluate the role of a full health management system, they did include
preventive medical interventions (such as immunization, micronutrient
supplementation, and clean delivery), curative interventions (such as oral
rehydration therapy through salt tablets, antibiotics for pneumonia and
sepsis, and antimalarial medications), promotion of breastfeeding, ITNs,
complementary feeding, and improved access to water, sanitation, and
hygiene education.67
MDG Needs Assessments for Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda
To be aligned with the MDGs, the full intervention package outlined in
appendix A must be converted into a country-level investment plan, one
that works backward from the outcome targets to identify needed input
targets and then identiﬁes infrastructure, human, and ﬁnancial resource
requirements to meet the targets. We dub this a “needs assessment”
158 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
65. Cleland and Van Ginneken (1988). 
66. Jones and others (2003). 
67. Importantly, Jones and others (2003) point out that their estimate of lives saved
through known interventions may be conservative, since they evaluate only those interven-
tions for which good cause-and-effect evidence exists and that are “feasible” for develop-
ing countries to implement (for example, they exclude emergency obstetric care). They do
not assess other underlying factors, such as maternal education, that have a strong although
indirect impact on child survival.
2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  158approach to the MDGs.68 Here we estimate the costs of interventions for
three countries: Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda. We chose these coun-
tries because all have high rates of extreme poverty, are making insuffi-
cient progress toward achieving the MDGs, and are well governed for
their level of income per capita, as indicated by their “good” and “aver-
age” governance ratings in table 2. These are countries where governance
is not the binding constraint.
To highlight the extent of poverty in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda,
table 11 summarizes available data for some key MDG indicators. Although
the underlying data are often imprecise and incomplete (a reﬂection of the
extreme poverty in these countries), they highlight each country’s uneven
progress across the MDGs. Persistently high rates of hunger and child
mortality are particularly notable. Indeed, the fact that Ghana’s child mor-
tality rate of 100 per 1,000 live births in 2001 is the lowest in the group
reﬂects how extreme poverty is in these countries. Human capital accu-
mulation meanwhile remains slow in Ghana and Tanzania in particular,
as reflected in their low primary enrollment rates, and more than a third
of the population in all three countries was living on less than $1 a day in
the latest available surveys.
To meet the MDGs systematically in each of these countries, we assume
that the interventions are scaled up linearly through 2015. As much as
possible, the intervention package is also adjusted according to the age
and gender structure of the population and to the rural-urban divide. To
account for population growth and other changes in a country’s demo-
graphic proﬁle, the UN Population Division’s 2002 revision of medium
population forecasts is used.69 Where more recent population data are
available at the country level, we use those.
For each intervention, such as the provision of ITNs or the hiring of
new teachers, we specify quantitative input targets that are consistent with
the MDGs. We then translate the interventions into budget lines, estimat-
ing ﬁnancial costs per year. We use local unit costs wherever possible and
regional proxies where these are not available. In some cases, unit costs
are assumed to increase as coverage rates increase. For example, teachers’
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68. The UN Millennium Project needs assessment (UN Millennium Project, 2004)
draws on several works including Bruns, Mingat, and Rakotomalala (2003), World Bank
(2002), Delamonica, Mehrotra, and Vandermoortele (2001), FAO (2002), Commission on
Macroeconomics and Health (2001), and Global Water Partnership (2000). 
69. United Nations (2003). 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  160salaries are increased to improve retention rates. Importantly, we estimate
capital as well as operating costs, and total costs instead of incremental
costs. This implicitly assumes that all investments and service deliveries
follow best practice, regardless of current efﬁcacy of delivery, yielding a
downward bias in our cost estimates. Since the marginal costs of a major
scale-up are unknown—they could be increasing or decreasing when
making investments in rural communities—we use average unit costs.
Next we identify key interventions that, upon implementation, would
reduce resource requirements for other interventions. The resulting cost sav-
ings can occur through reductions in the population in need or reductions in
unit costs for other interventions. Quantifying these links is often difﬁcult,
especially for the interventions that have numerous indirect effects, such as
girls’ education. And even where clear data exist, the magnitude of the
impact may not be known for different settings or for different delivery
mechanisms. Nonetheless, our estimates include the effect of several syner-
gies that are likely to result in particularly large cost savings. These are a
reduction in diarrhea morbidity through expanded access to improved water
supply and sanitation, including improved hygiene behavior; a reduction in
acute respiratory infections through increased use of improved cooking
fuels; a reduction in HIV/AIDS incidence through increased condom use;
and a reduction in malaria incidence through increased use of ITNs.
As a last step in the needs assessment, we develop a basic financing
strategy for each country, distinguishing among domestic government
resources, out-of-pocket household expenditure, and ODA. We assume
that domestically financed government spending on MDG-related inter-
ventions will rise by 4 percentage points of GDP between 2005 and 2015,
in addition to the increase in domestic resource availability resulting from
GDP growth alone. We also assume that, as a result of this package of
interventions, GDP per capita rises between 2.2 and 3.3 percent a year on
average during 2005–15, which is approximately the growth rate needed
to reduce income poverty by half at an average elasticity of headcount
poverty with respect to income per capita of −1.4.70
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70. Several studies have estimated these elasticities for low-income countries. Bruno,
Ravallion, and Squire (1998) estimate a global average of –2, whereas Besley and Burgess
(2003) cite a low value of –0.49 for sub-Saharan Africa. In the case of Uganda, the
Economic Policy Research Center estimates a value of –1.39 (Okidi, Okwi, and Ddumba,
2000); Tanzania’s elasticity for basic needs poverty has been estimated at –1.45
(TAKWIMU, 2000). 
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of user fees and overall ability to pay. Since user fees can play a critical
role in preventing poor people from accessing basic services, we assume
no user fees for primary school education, adult literacy programs,
improving gender equality, basic health care, nutritional interventions,
and roads.71 In some cases, however, user fees may be necessary to avoid
wasting scarce resources after basic minimum needs have been ensured.
“Lifeline tariffs,” which ensure the free provision of water (or other basic
needs) up to the minimum daily requirement for personal hygiene and
cooking, but then charge for consumption above the minimum, have been
used successfully in many parts of the world to avoid wastage while
improving access to clean drinking water. We assume that households
bear some of the cost of agricultural interventions, secondary school edu-
cation, energy provision, water supply, and sanitation. To calculate
households’ ability to pay, we divide the population of each country into
three segments using income shares derived from national household bud-
get surveys as reported by the World Bank.72 It is assumed that the poor-
est segment of the population, that living below the national poverty line,
will not contribute to the cost of meeting the MDGs. The middle segment
and the top segment (with income above twice the poverty line) are
assumed to contribute larger shares of operating and capital costs.73
A core result of our needs assessment is that the investment program
required to meet the MDGs is beyond the ﬁnancing means of the poorest
countries, even when one assumes that governments will devote an addi-
tional 4 percent of GNP to meeting the MDGs alongside roughly 3 per-
cent annual growth in income per capita and that households contribute to
the increased investments. We estimate an “MDG financing gap” as the
total cost of the package of interventions minus the contributions by the
162 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
71. “Experience has taught repeatedly that user fees end up excluding the poor from
essential health services, while at the same time recovering only a tiny fraction of costs”
(Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001, p. 61). Even modest user fees have
been shown to have a strong impact on reducing effective access to these basic services,
particularly for women, young girls, and other vulnerable groups. See World Education
Forum (2000). The Education for All Dakar Goal 2 reads as follows: “Ensuring that by
2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difﬁcult circumstances, and those belonging
to ethnic minorities, have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of
good quality” (available at www.unesco.org/education/efa/ed_for_all/dakfram_eng.shtml).
72. World Bank (2003a).
73. Details are outlined in UN Millennium Project (2004).
2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  162domestic government and households. This is the amount that donors
would have to bear in order to finance the MDG intervention package.
Table 12 presents the total estimated resource requirements for the three
countries, based on an eleven-year scale-up period from 2005 through
2015. The results suggest that each of the three countries will be able to
ﬁnance between 41 and 48 percent of the total investment needs through
domestic sources. This translates into an average total need for external
development assistance equivalent to $47 (for Uganda) to $60 (for Tanza-
nia) per capita per year. Points of interest for each country are drawn from
the UN Millennium Project and summarized below:74
—Ghana’s total investment needs for meeting the MDGs aver-
age $2.0 billion a year, or $82.8 annually per capita. Of this total, 
$1.2 billion is estimated for required average annual external assistance.
This need remains signiﬁcantly above the $653 million in net ODA that
donors disbursed to Ghana in 2001 for MDG- and non-MDG-related
activities.
—Of the three countries in our sample, Tanzania faces the biggest
challenges in meeting the MDGs. We estimate that the country will
require the highest per capita levels of average investment and external
ﬁnance to meet the MDGs, at $100.4 and $60.2, respectively. These ﬁg-
ures are equivalent to an aggregate investment of $4.2 billion a year and
imply external ﬁnance of $2.5 billion a year. More than a third of these
investments are required to achieve the health MDGs, because of the
country’s high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and malaria.
—Uganda is widely lauded for its progress in education and its HIV/
AIDS control program over the past decade. However, the country still
remains off track in several areas, including hunger, health, and water.
We project that the country will need to spend an average of $3.0 billion
a year to meet the MDGs, or $89.7 per capita. More than half of these
investments will need to be financed externally, requiring an average 
of $1.6 billion, or $46.7 per capita, annually. An important gap in our
Uganda study is an estimate of the transport and communications infra-
structure required to provide the landlocked country with improved ac-
cess to world markets. The Northern Corridor highway to Mombasa,
Kenya, is in critical need of upgrading, as is the rail infrastructure.
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Table 12. Estimated Total Cost and Projected Sources of Funding to Meet
Millennium Development Goals in Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda, 2005–15a
Ghana Tanzania Uganda
Cost (or funding Per Per Per
source) and  Percent capita Percent capita Percent capita
intervention area of GDP (dollars) of GDP (dollars) of GDP (dollars)
Total costb
Hunger 1.9 5.9 3.2 11.5 1.7 5.9
Education 5.6 17.7 3.3 12.1 4.1 13.9
Gender equality 0.7 2.1 0.6 2.4 0.7 2.3
Health 7.9 24.8 9.6 34.8 9.4 32.2
Water supply  2.8 8.8 1.6 5.9 1.1 3.9
and sanitation
Energy 4.5 14.3 4.0 14.4 3.8 13.0
Roads 2.9 9.2 5.3 19.4 5.4 18.4
Total 26.3 82.8 27.7 100.4 26.3 89.7
Financing sources:
Household contribution
Hunger 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.8 0.4 1.2
Education 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.7 0.6 1.9
Gender equality 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Health 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Water supply  1.2 3.9 0.7 2.7 0.5 1.7
and sanitation
Energy 1.4 4.5 1.3 4.8 1.2 4.0
Roads 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 3.3 10.2 2.8 10.0 2.6 8.9
Domestically ﬁnanced government expenditurec
Hunger 0.5 1.7 1.0 3.5 0.7 2.3
Education 1.6 5.0 1.0 3.6 1.5 5.3
Gender equality 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.9
Health 2.2 7.0 2.9 10.5 3.6 12.2
Water supply  0.8 2.5 0.5 1.8 0.4 1.5
and sanitation
Energy 1.3 4.0 1.2 4.3 1.4 4.9
Roads 0.8 2.6 1.6 5.8 2.1 7.0
Total 7.5 23.5 8.3 30.2 10.0 34.1
Required total external budget support
Hunger 1.1 3.3 1.7 6.2 0.7 2.4
Education 3.7 11.8 2.1 7.8 2.0 6.7
Gender equality 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.6 0.4 1.4
Health 5.7 17.8 6.7 24.3 5.9 20.0
Water supply  0.8 2.4 0.4 1.5 0.2 0.7
and sanitation
Energy 1.8 5.7 1.4 5.2 1.2 4.1
Roads 2.1 6.6 3.7 13.6 3.4 11.4
Total 15.6 49.1 16.6 60.2 13.7 46.7
Source: UN Millennium Project (2004).
a. Data are averages per year. Costs for three intervention areas (environment, improving the lives of slum dwellers, and
science and technology) are still to be determined. Data may not sum to totals because of rounding.
b. Sum of household contributions, domestically ﬁnanced government expenditure, and required total external budget support. 
c. Government expenditure on the MDGs ﬁnanced solely through domestic revenue generation; on a pro forma basis, expen-
ditures are allocated to budget line items based on their relative share of funding from all sources.
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up needs assessments yield detailed estimates of each country’s human re-
source and infrastructure requirements. For example, our analysis suggests
that Tanzania will need to increase the number of primary and secondary
school teachers from approximately 134,000 in 2005 to 215,000 in 2015.
We emphasize that these results are preliminary and likely to underes-
timate the true costs of achieving the MDGs in each country, since they
assume an optimal intervention package and exclude a number of expen-
sive interventions, such as ports, railroads, infrastructure for water storage
and transport, urban infrastructure and slum upgrading, expanding higher
education, and information and communications technologies.75 The esti-
mates nonetheless provide an important ﬁrst approximation of the combi-
nation of resources and inputs required to achieve the MDGs.
Implications for Development Assistance
The external financing requirements presented in table 12 are not total
ODA needs. Table 12 includes only MDG-oriented investments and ex-
cludes programs that are not directly linked to the MDGs but that might
be indirectly important, such as support for the judicial system or other
institutions that underpin democratic governance. To calculate the three
countries’ total ODA needs, one needs to add other important forms of
ODA to directly MDG-focused ODA. One can then identify the total
incremental ODA need for each country.
Table 13 presents estimated current ODA and incremental total ODA
needs for Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda. The ﬁrst column shows aid lev-
els per capita in 2001. The second indicates the estimated share of that
ODA that is focused on MDG-related activities other than those address-
ing income poverty, using a decomposition accounting methodology
developed by Brian Hammond of the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC). The actual results produced through that methodology
were in the range of 33 to 59 percent, but because it is difﬁcult to allocate
aid ﬂows precisely to each MDG, and because poor aid quality (for exam-
ple, due to lack of donor coordination) often limits resource efﬁcacy, we
assume a ﬁgure toward the low side of that range, namely, 40 percent. The
third column of the table reports the estimate of non-MDG aid per capita.
Sachs, McArthur, Schmidt-Traub, Kruk, Bahadur, Faye, and McCord 165
75. Appendix A lists all the interventions that have so far not been included in the
needs assessment. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  166We assume perfect donor delivery mechanisms and so do not distinguish
between currently efﬁcient and inefﬁcient aid dollars. This biases upward
the estimate of current MDG-related aid and biases downward the implied
aid gap. The fourth column of the table repeats from table 12 the esti-
mated total external ﬁnance gaps per capita. The ﬁfth column then
assumes that current non-MDG aid spending will remain constant as
MDG-based investments are scaled up, so that the total ODA need per
capita is the sum of MDG-targeted ODA and complementary ODA. The
sixth column presents the implied shortfall in ODA per capita, indicating
that roughly a doubling of ODA is needed in each country.
The seventh column of table 13 then presents the average GDP per
capita that is assumed by our ﬁnancing model, which in turn is used to
calculate the ﬁnal column, total ODA required as a share of GDP in each
country. The results, which range from 20 to 23 percent of GDP, present a
lower bound for estimates of the aid required for these three countries to
achieve the MDGs. These are lower bounds because the costing model
excludes several “big ticket” items listed above and neglects the inherent
overhead costs of managing aid delivery, which are likely in the neigh-
borhood of 15 to 20 percent of total aid, or 3 to 4 percentage points of
GDP. Overall, the results thus suggest that these countries will require
average ODA equivalent to 20 to 30 percent of GDP through 2015.
A New Framework for Donor-Recipient Country Relations
The package of public investments proposed in this paper implies a
signiﬁcant increase in ODA transfers to Africa, perhaps a doubling or
more. Many will read this as an excessively bold proposal, because skep-
ticism is widespread among policymakers and voters regarding the efﬁ-
ciency and level of coordination in aid delivery. Although there is much
evidence that aid works, it is true that, even in well-governed developing
countries, a lack of coordination and goal orientation leave the current
system far from adequate to the task. Nonetheless, the pieces of the solu-
tion are now coming together. For instance, there is broad conceptual
agreement on the need to focus on poverty as an outcome rather than on
macroeconomic stability alone. Likewise there is recognition of the need
to provide development assistance through common ﬁnancing arrange-
ments that harmonize donor practices and allow recipient countries to
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2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  167deﬁne their own Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSs).76 In what follows
we sketch the kind of donor-recipient mechanisms that will be needed to
translate large-scale aid ﬂows into effective investments and poverty
reduction under conditions of good governance, as well as some thoughts
on situations where governance is inadequate to justify large-scale aid
ﬂows.
Guidelines for Converting Goals into Plans 
in Well-Governed Countries
To meet the MDGs in cases where domestic governance is adequate (that
is, at or above the norm for countries at the given income level), aid pro-
cesses should be guided by four core principles. First, policies should be
aligned with the 2015 time horizon, with that MDG target date serving as
the planning horizon for both recipient countries and donors. Given a
decade-long horizon, developing countries can address key questions of
absorptive capacity by investing in human resources and infrastructure.
The international adoption of a 2015-based planning horizon would amount
to an enormous shift in development policy, because today’s primary vehi-
cles for development assistance in Africa, the Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers (PRSPs) and Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks, adopt a
much shorter horizon, usually three years. Within such a short-term view,
today’s absorptive capacity constraints are seen as fundamental impedi-
ments rather than as targets of opportunity for public investment, espe-
cially in human resources and managerial capacity.
Second, the public investment program needs to be guided by bottom-
up assessments of needs rather than ex ante budget constraints set by the
donor countries. In development policy as practiced today, the ﬁrst point
of discussion is to identify the external resources available to a country
and then to decide how those resources can best be deployed. Crucially,
we recommend that this process be turned on its head. The ﬁrst step would
be to undertake a real needs assessment methodology along the lines of
that presented in this paper. The second would be to mobilize the neces-
sary external resources. This differs from current practice in that the PRSPs
are the core development assistance framework for Africa, yet the World
Bank’s own assessment shows that these documents are not consistently
168 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
76. This was reafﬁrmed in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and subsequently in the
Rome Declaration on Harmonization.
2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  168aligned with the MDGs.77 This happens because, in the typical case where
existing development assistance ﬂows are insufﬁcient to achieve the MDGs,
developing country governments are encouraged not to be too ambitious
in aspiring to the MDGs but instead to be “realistic” in their targets. They
are encouraged to “accelerate progress toward the MDGs” rather than to
achieve the MDGs.78
A related and perhaps deeper problem within the current approach to
goal setting is that targets in many PRSPs have been based solely on loose
aspirations rather than on a rigorous assessment of the real investment
needed to achieve the targets. According to the World Bank’s own PRSP
sourcebook, “[PRSP] targets tend to be too optimistic, and the cost of
reaching them tends to be underestimated.”79 A rigorous MDG-oriented
process must therefore include not just outcome goals, but also specific
paths that will lead to those goals, with clear and monitorable input tar-
gets, including adequate ﬁnancing.
Third, donor assistance needs to be harmonized and coordinated
around budget support, particularly in countries like Ghana, Uganda, and
Tanzania where governance structures are not the binding constraint on
accelerating progress toward achieving the MDGs. Uncoordinated and
supply-driven development assistance from the twenty-three bilateral
donors that are members of the DAC places unnecessary transactions cost
burdens on recipient country governments. The tendency for bilateral
donors to go their own way in providing project support is known as
“planting the ﬂag,” because the donor country gets political credit and a
good photo opportunity for its aid. We strongly urge a less photogenic but
more meaningful approach, in which donors combine their resources into
a common pool of budgetary support. A convenient way to do this would
be to increase substantially the funding provided by the World Bank
through its concessional lending arm, the International Development
Association. Current IDA ﬂows are on the order of $8 billion a year, and
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77. The data in Harrison, Klugman, and Swanson (2003) show the lack of PRSP align-
ment with the MDGs. Their table 5, for example, indicates that seven of twelve recent
PRSPs do not even include targets that can be compared with the hunger MDG. Similarly,
seven of twelve do not have targets relevant to the education MDG.
78. The language of “accelerating progress toward the MDGs” rather than “achieving
the MDGs” is used, for instance, in the recent World Bank staff paper for the Bank’s
Development Committee (World Bank, 2003c). 
79. See, for instance, the critique of “too optimistic” PRSP targets in Christiansen,
Scott, and Wodon (2002).
2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:21    Page  169these could be tripled or more in coming years to be consistent with the
scale of need that we have identiﬁed. A somewhat more complicated
alternative would be for the bilateral donors to pool their money at the
country level into budget support for particular sectors, in what is known
as the sector-wide approach (SWAp).
As presented in table 14, which draws on OECD statistics, only about
27 percent of the net transfer of bilateral ODA to sub-Saharan Africa in
2002 took the form of budget support. For both bilateral and multilateral
aid ﬂows, the table calculates budget support by subtracting from gross
ODA (loans and grants) those forms of ODA that do not go toward sup-
porting the recipient government’s budget (these include technical coop-
eration, development food aid, emergency aid, debt forgiveness, support
through nongovernmental organizations, and repayments of loan princi-
pal and interest). Note that a signiﬁcant portion of this budget support still
170 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
Table 14. Estimated Budget Support to All of Sub-Saharan Africa, 2002a
Millions of dollars 
From From
bilateral multilateral
Item sources sources Total 
Grants 9,735 2,831 12,566
Gross loans 732 5,032 5,764
Gross ODA disbursements 10,467 7,863 18,330
Minus:
Technical cooperation 2,412 419 2,831
Development food aid 336 104 439
Emergency aid 1,023 620 1,643
Debt forgiveness grants 2,911 279 3,191
Support through nongovernmental  378 0 378
organizationsb 7,061 1,422 8,483
Equals: Gross ODA paid into  3,406 6,441 9,848
government budgets
Minus:
Principal repayments actually made 454 1,480 1,934
Interest payments 87 449 536
Equals: Estimated net budget support 2,865 4,513 7,377
As share of total support (percent) 27 57 40
Source: Estimates by Yasmin Ahmad, Brian Hammond, and Rudolphe Petras, Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
Secretariat, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, personal correspondence with the authors, May 2004.
a. Numbers may not sum to totals because of rounding.
b. Based on DAC estimates.
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terms. As hinted by the “technical cooperation” line of the table, tied aid
(the practice of linking development assistance to the purchase of donor
country goods or services) also remains a signiﬁcant issue for many
developing countries.
Fourth, reforming donor ﬁnancing requires new notions of sustainabil-
ity. The ﬁrst point is that recipient countries will need large-scale support
for many years to come—at least a decade and possibly more. Therefore
it is completely unsound to expect development projects or programs to
become self-sustaining ﬁnancially in a few years, as many donors now
assume. It is also necessary, for the poorest countries, to finance these
programs through grants rather than loans. We have seen that countries
will require perhaps 20 to 30 percent of their GDP in annual development
assistance for a decade or more. If much of this comes in the form of loans,
those countries will be bankrupt once again by the end of the decade. Grant
ﬁnancing is the only way to pay for the investments and leave the recipi-
ent countries with viable public ﬁnances at the end of the process. For the
same reason, the outstanding debts of the poorest countries should also be
cancelled in their entirety as part of the MDG process. After all, what is
the meaning of “debt sustainability” for a country that also requires annual
aid of more than 20 percent of GDP just to achieve basic poverty reduc-
tion targets? Debt cancellation will need to be deepened accordingly.80
National Planning Processes
We recommend that African governments implement these guiding
principles through a three-stage process. First, each country should con-
vene a planning team comprising its own representatives and those of key
stakeholders and technical advisers—the bilateral and multilateral donors,
UN specialized agencies, and civil society leaders—to conduct an MDG
needs assessment. In the second step, the needs assessment should feed
into a ten-year public investment and human resource strategy. The third
step would be to construct the medium-term budget framework (covering,
for example, three years, as with the PRSPs), which would ﬁnance the
ﬁrst three years of the ten-year investment strategy.
Developing multisector ten-year scale-up plans will require a great
deal of technical work. In the poorest countries, UN agencies already pro-
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in assisting national governments as they develop their MDG plans. The
challenge will be to coordinate this work around the speciﬁc MDGs. In
most low-income countries, the resident representatives of all agencies
now meet regularly as UN Country Teams (UNCTs), which report to the
UN Development Group that was established by the secretary-general in
1997 as the overall coordination mechanism among development-
oriented UN agencies. The UNCTs, including representatives of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, can provide vital
assistance to countries in formulating the ten-year strategy and three-year
budget framework.
As an explicit MDG-based planning framework is developed, increases
in ODA inﬂows will raise a number of structural macroeconomic issues.
Countries must maintain their efforts to mobilize domestic revenue and
foster domestic saving and investment in order to support long-term eco-
nomic growth. We have assumed, for example, that governments will raise
domestic resources committed to the MDGs by 4 percent of GNP. Of
course, governments should not spend what they do not have, especially if
the funds are obtained through domestic credit expansion. The increased
MDG investment program must be ﬁnanced through reliable increases in
ODA grants.
With signiﬁcant increases in ODA inﬂows, issues of Dutch disease will
arise and need to be managed carefully. However, the implications should
not be too quantitatively signiﬁcant, as Alessandro Prati and his col-
leagues have argued.81 The reason is that there is a substantial tradable
goods component to scaling up, both in capital investments and in the
high proportion of skilled labor that is globally mobile. The ODA will
also be directed toward raising supply-side productivity through invest-
ments in agriculture and human capital rather than toward a consumption
boom of the kind typically linked to a squeeze in the tradable goods sec-
tor. More important than the size of the ODA inﬂows is their predictabil-
ity, as the IMF’s own analysis has shown.82
Underlying this discussion of macroeconomic programming is the con-
sideration of what to do if donor funds are not readily forthcoming to
meet the needs of the MDG-based PRSP. In that case, of course, the
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urge the country to live within its means. It should also present the techni-
cal case that the country could achieve the MDGs if given additional sup-
port, and it should urge donor countries to expand available support to a
level that would enable any well-governed African country making the
effort to achieve the MDGs.
National Implementation Processes
Government-led coordination will be crucial not just for crafting these
plans but also for implementing them. As their part of the bargain, recipi-
ent governments will need to put in place a clear and transparent system
for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the plans, building in
regular milestones and checkpoints through which the plans can be ﬁne-
tuned or adjusted as necessary. Public evaluation of plans will need to take
place within the context of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The APRM,
which is beginning its ﬁrst evaluations in 2004, entails African countries
publicly reviewing each other’s performance in four categories: democ-
racy and political governance, economic governance and management,
corporate governance, and socioeconomic development.
To ensure that ODA resources are being used effectively, monitoring
and evaluation mechanisms will need to be included in the MDG-based
PRSs, including PRSPs when appropriate. These systems will need to
evolve as scale-up proceeds, but they will need to be consistently guided
by key principles of ﬁscal accountability, institutional strengthening, sub-
stantive goal orientation, and benchmarking of progress.83 Importantly,
progress will need to be measured with respect to both ﬁnancial manage-
ment and MDG-based development outcomes. Too often, development
evaluations focus on assessing the procedural outcomes of projects and
processes rather than the development outcomes of programs. More impor-
tant, intermediate input targets and milestones will be required en route to
reaching the long-term outcome goals. For instance, bed net use needs
to be measured as an input en route to reducing the incidence of malaria.
Before implementation of the PRS begins, such intermediate and outcome
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ments and then agreed upon by the donors.
Domestically, successful implementation will require African govern-
ments to work closely with civil society organizations to ensure that public
trust is maintained in the accountability of public expenditure managers,
to identify best mechanisms for service scale-up, and to help with ser-
vice delivery where appropriate. Procedures for public accountability in-
clude the opportunity for consultation in policy planning processes, the
release of budgets for public review, and the release of independent audit
reports on public expenditure. In larger countries where it is difficult to
transmit information to remote rural areas, distributive mechanisms of
budget disbursement and community-based oversight can be most appro-
priate both for maintaining accountability and for identifying the best
means of service delivery. For instance, targeted block grants can be given
to rural communities, allowing them to decide how those resources should
best be spent. There is considerable evidence to suggest that women’s com-
munity organizations should be given key oversight roles, since their mem-
bers make household investment decisions that yield greater community
benefits than those made by men.84 Actual delivery of services will no
doubt involve a mix of public sector institutions, nongovernmental orga-
nizations that operate on a national scale, and community-based organiza-
tions that receive transfers from the public sector.
Donor Assistance When Governance is Weak
Although the bulk of this paper focuses on poor African countries with
good governance, a few observations can be made about what to do in
poorly governed countries. In those instances the preceding framework
will not apply, mainly because development aid allocated to poorly func-
tioning governments can easily be squandered or even used to reinforce
bad practices. The key is to understand the nature of the poor gover-
nance and to take actions that make sense in that context. Here we offer
some basic thoughts on this difﬁcult topic.
In some cases what is called “poor governance” is in fact an issue of
lack of financial resources to carry out reasonable public functions. The
political and social will may be present, but the government may simply
lack the means to maintain an effective police force, judiciary, and other
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make a significant difference, not only by financing key public invest-
ments but also by ﬁnancing key instruments of governance.
In other cases the problems of governance run deeper than simple lack
of ﬁnances. They may involve violent conﬂict, authoritarian rule, or cor-
rupt and predatory practices by the state. When the problem is violent
conﬂict, the role of aid needs to be focused in the ﬁrst instance on peace-
making, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. Early funding of
postconﬂict situations may help to sustain the peace, for example by pro-
viding funds for disarmament and resettlement of combatants. Aid may
also be vital for refugees and the sustenance and relocation of displaced
populations. The current aid system operates haphazardly in these cir-
cumstances, although the case of Liberia provided an impressive recent
example of a rapid UN system response in designing a postconflict aid
agenda. Of course, in this and related cases a key question is whether
pledged donor support will actually arrive in a timely fashion.
When the problem is entrenched despotic rule, large-scale aid transfers
to the government are ill advised. Even tight conditionality will not be
very successful in ensuring that such aid is well used. Governments that
do not intend to carry out needed reforms can find too many ways to cir-
cumvent the conditions. Therefore our basic answer for this scenario is
that the scale of aid to such governments should be limited, and aid should
be substantially allocated through nongovernmental organizations and
international agencies rather than through the central government. This
approach will generally not be sufﬁcient to achieve the MDGs, but it will
at least help to ensure progress (or lack of retrogression).
Some guidelines on providing aid in this “third-best” situation might
include the following. First, donors should focus on direct delivery of
humanitarian assistance and on cases where aid is provided in kind and
delivery is monitorable (immunizations or emergency food programs, for
example). These programs have proved successful even in situations of
disastrously poor governance. “Immunization days,” for example, have
been successfully implemented in the middle of civil wars. Second,
donors should seek out nongovernmental organizations that can effectively
deliver longer-term services, such as health care and education, recogniz-
ing that the scale of services provided by such organizations will rarely
substitute for effective public sector delivery. Third, donors should encour-
age small-scale demonstration projects by civil society, as precursors 
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Fourth, cutoffs in aid should not be used punitively in an attempt to ﬁne-
tune the quality of governance (for example, in protest of a single govern-
ment decision that the donor ﬁnds undesirable). Micromanagement of
local governance is a disaster and a self-fulﬁlling trap. When aid is cut,
governance itself is put in jeopardy. Cutting aid over small matters can
easily trigger a downward spiral of political instability.
Finally, we have serious reservations about punitive sanctions, such as
trade embargoes, on poorly governed countries. Although such countries
cannot be entrusted with large-scale aid inﬂows, it is a mistake to punish
them with trade embargoes (other than an arms embargo). Trade sanctions
rarely bring down a government, because they weaken civil society at
least as much as they weaken government power. Therefore they tend to
create intense economic hardship without tilting the balance of power
between a despotic government and its opposition. Of course, in a few
widely noted cases (such as the end of apartheid in South Africa), trade
sanctions seem to have played a role in accelerating the transition to good
governance, but an even larger number of cases can be cited (Cuba, Haiti,
and Myanmar, for example) where trade sanctions made little difference
to governance, but instead contributed to country-wide impoverishment.
The Role of Trade Reform
Most of this paper has focused on the quantity and direction of ODA
needed for African countries to make the public investments necessary to
break out of a poverty trap. The implied aid ﬂows are large, equivalent to
20 to 30 percent of recipient countries’ GDP over the course of a decade
or more. An important related issue is how these costs compare with the
beneﬁts of increased international trade. Could improved trade conditions
substitute for the required aid? Have the advocates of “trade, not aid” dis-
covered a less expensive solution? These questions are particularly rele-
vant in the context of the current Doha round of negotiations under the
auspices of the World Trade Organization, which are meant to focus in
large part on developing country needs, although the talks have produced
few results as yet. The long-term ambition for African economies with
respect to trade needs to be to diversify away from dependence on com-
modity exports and the related long-term decline in terms of trade, but
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access remains crucial for African exporters, as is an intellectual property
regime that permits reliable access to key pharmaceutical products and a
trade regime that allows enough ﬂexibility for countries to implement
industrial promotion policies. Yet even though trade reform is welcome
and important, it is certainly not sufﬁcient to achieve the MDGs. Trade
will not directly provide the targeted public investment strategies outlined
above, and the gains from trade are simply insufﬁcient to ﬁnance the nec-
essary investments. Even the much-heralded Africa Growth and Opportu-
nity Act of the United States has had only marginal effects on most
African countries’ exports.86
Within the African trade agenda, the most immediate political priority
is progress in agricultural trade liberalization.87 Yet progress will mean
different things in different countries. The countries that are net agricul-
tural exporters will naturally seek greater access to protected markets 
in industrial countries for their exports. Those that are net agricultural
importers, particularly food importers, are at risk of immediate adverse
welfare shocks if, for instance, industrial countries’ export subsidies are
quickly removed, resulting in major price increases for core foodstuffs.88
Many countries in Africa are net food importers but net exporters of non-
food agricultural products, so that welfare outcomes from trade liberal-
ization will be mixed. Given these countervailing forces and existing
data limitations, it is difficult to estimate the country-specific effects of
trade liberalization packages. That challenge is further compounded by
our proposal to double or triple agricultural productivity through a pack-
age of rural investments, since most trade modeling exercises are limited
to comparative statics and hold agricultural productivity constant when
examining changes in trade regimes.
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tural trade liberalization measures by distinguishing between the impact
of liberalization of food commodities and that of liberalization of nonfood
commodities. Among the latter, cotton is likely the most prominent. It is
estimated that the United States spends nearly $4 billion a year on cot-
ton subsidies, or more than twice the entire annual U.S. bilateral devel-
opment assistance budget for Africa, to maintain annual production by its
roughly 25,000 cotton growers at about $4 billion a year.89 China exports
much less cotton than the United States but supports its domestic cotton
production with $1.2 billion in annual subsidies; the European Union
directs roughly $0.8 billion a year to support cotton producers in Greece
and Spain.
Although the precise global impact of cotton subsidies is not easily cal-
culated, they clearly have a deleterious effect on several West African
economies, especially Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Togo, where
cotton production amounts to a significant portion of GDP and a large
share of agricultural export earnings. In Mali, for instance, cotton pro-
duction was 9 percent of GDP and 38 percent of merchandise exports in
2000–01. In Benin it was 5.3 percent of GDP in the same period and fully
two-thirds of merchandise exports.90 John Baffes estimates that global
cotton liberalization would raise the world price by approximately 13 per-
cent over what it would be without reforms.91 This would present a clear
beneﬁt to West African cotton producers, whose exports under liberaliza-
tion would also increase by an estimated 13 percent annually.92 In welfare
terms the West African cotton-exporting countries could enjoy as much as
a 1 or 2 percent increase in GDP from cotton trade liberalization. In com-
parison, their ODA needs are above 20 percent of GNP.
The liberalization story is much more complicated for food commodi-
ties, among which sugar and groundnuts are two of the most important
products for Africa. These two foodstuffs are subject to very different
global trade dynamics. As is well known, sugar is one of the world’s most
protected industries. In the European Union, long-standing domestic sub-
sidies and quotas have maintained prices for producers at roughly double
the world price, resulting in overproduction and limited market access for
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port are also in effect in the United States and Japan. However, many
African countries beneﬁt from the EU Sugar Protocol, a series of bilateral
sugar trading agreements that give some developing countries preferential
access to sell sugar at the vastly inﬂated European prices. Beneﬁciaries
include the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mauritius, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.93
The Sugar Protocol arrangement is extremely lucrative to the most suc-
cessful African exporters, Mauritius and Swaziland, but these are both
middle-income countries, and so its benefits are distributed somewhat
regressively.94 Among low-income countries, the Sugar Protocol yields
beneﬁts of roughly $10 million a year to Malawi, or a minuscule 90 cents
per capita.95 The United States also has a quota system in place, but it
tends to prefer Latin American sugar producers and so is of less signiﬁ-
cance for African countries.
Although sugar is one of the few products exempted from the EU
Everything But Arms initiative, the European Union is scheduled to
start reducing sugar tariffs in July 2006, with full phase-out complete by
July 2009. While the precise path of future European sugar market
reform is uncertain, it is estimated that full liberalization of industrial
country sugar markets would yield a 40 percent increase in the world
price. Yet that new price would still be less than the current price avail-
able through preferential access, and thus many African sugar producers
would not necessarily gain from the world price change.96 Moreover, a
removal of import quotas in Europe, Japan, and the United States would
benefit the low-cost sugar producers such as Australia and Brazil much
more than the African producers. All told, the net liberalization effect
for African sugar producers is unclear and, if positive, likely to be
extremely small.97
Groundnut products, meanwhile, follow very different patterns of pro-
duction and protection. China and India together produce nearly two-
thirds of the world’s groundnuts. Those countries’ high levels of domestic
consumption and market protection result in very thin international mar-
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the major traders are China (32 percent share of total exports), the United
States (19 percent), and Argentina (11 percent). Collectively, the ground-
nut exporters of sub-Saharan Africa—The Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria,
Senegal, South Africa, and Sudan—account for only 5 percent of the traded
market.98 Since the groundnut markets of Argentina, China, India, and the
United States are all protected, one might think that full liberalization
would create a major opportunity for African producers. However, the
results again differ by country. Ndiame Diop, John Beghin, and Mirvat
Sewadeh estimate that the African winners would be Senegal, which is
slated to gain $21 million a year, or $2 per capita (in 1995 dollars), and
Nigeria, which would gain $13 million a year, or roughly 10 cents per
capita.99 The Gambia is estimated to gain less than half a million dollars a
year, or 35 cents per capita, and Malawi would lose roughly $1 million a
year, or 9 cents per capita.
Although we discuss only three commodities here, product-by-product
assessments are instructive for pinpointing who wins and who loses from
specific components of trade policy. The evidence is also important for
highlighting that the benefits from liberalization in particular commodi-
ties are not necessarily enormous, if indeed they are positive at all. A key
question thus hinges on how the benefits of trade liberalization aggregate
across products. Elena Ianchovichina, Aaditya Mattoo, and Marcelo
Olarreaga focus on the beneﬁts of full access to the “Quad” markets of
Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the United States; they estimate
that such access would yield a $2.5 billion, or 14 percent, increase in
nonoil exports and a $1.8 billion, or 1.2 percent, welfare enhancement for
thirty-seven sub-Saharan African countries (all except Angola, Botswana,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe).100 Most of these beneﬁts
would accrue through improved access to EU markets. Ianchovichina and
colleagues also estimate that if, in addition to full Quad access, nonpref-
erential tariffs were cut by 25 percent across all countries, this would
remove more than $500 million of the same African countries’ beneﬁts.
Thus full rich-country access and signiﬁcant global tariff liberalization
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Africa.
Other researchers have used different modeling assumptions to estimate
trade liberalization benefits of a similar order of magnitude. Anderson
and others calculate that the countries of the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU; Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swazi-
land) would gain nearly $1.4 billion a year from full global trade liberal-
ization, and that the rest of sub-Saharan Africa would gain $3.2 billion
(both ﬁgures in 1995 dollars).101 The United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) meanwhile estimates that comprehensive,
across-the-board cuts in agricultural and manufacturing tariffs by 50 per-
cent would entail a terms-of-trade loss to sub-Saharan Africa that would
balance the market access beneﬁts, to yield an outcome that is effectively
welfare neutral.102 Stephen Tokarick estimates the net effects of global agri-
cultural liberalization for SACU members at $1.8 billion a year, or 1.3 per-
cent of GDP.103 For the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, he estimates the total
beneﬁts at $1.0 billion, or roughly 0.5 percent of GDP.
This range of estimates underscores a key point. Even if the Doha
trade negotiations yielded African countries the most optimistic of esti-
mated outcomes, these countries’ benefits would likely not exceed 1 or
2 percent of GDP a year. Although these benefits would be nontrivial in
scale and important for long-term economic development, they would be
an order of magnitude less than the level of resources required to achieve
the MDGs in the poorest countries. They are not a substitute for the sus-
tained increases in ODA needed to fund the public investments described
in this paper.
The diversity of commodity-speciﬁc, and thereby country-speciﬁc, trade
scenarios underscores a second crucial point for macroeconomic planning.
Just as a local needs assessment approach is necessary to identify the pub-
lic investments that a country should undertake, so, too, a similar approach
must be taken to identify how a country’s macroeconomic framework will
evolve in step with changes to the global trade system. Some net exporters
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suffer tremendously. The MDG-based PRS process will need to be devel-
oped and constantly updated, within a larger process that systematically
anticipates how the poorest countries will be affected by changes in inter-
national trade policy. Those countries slated to suffer losses from trade
liberalization will need to have their external assistance adjusted upward
accordingly.
Regional Integration and Cross-Country Infrastructure
The small populations of most African countries and the large number
of landlocked countries reinforce the need for deepening regional inte-
gration and investments in cross-country transport, energy, and com-
munications infrastructure, as promoted by NEPAD.104 Not only does
sub-Saharan Africa have extremely low per capita densities of rail and
road infrastructure, but indeed existing transport systems were largely
designed under colonial rule to transport natural resources from the inte-
rior to the nearest port. As a result, cross-country transport connections
within Africa tend to be extremely poor and are in urgent need of exten-
sion, to reduce intraregional transport costs and promote cross-border
trade.
Regional cooperation is also needed to develop and consolidate energy
supplies. Countries across sub-Saharan Africa need to invest in petroleum
refining, storage, and distribution infrastructure, including pipelines to
lower transport costs and ensure the continuous availability of fuel through-
out the region. Cross-country infrastructure for the transmission of elec-
tricity also needs to be improved.105 Similarly, a regional backbone of
information and communications infrastructure is required.
Regional organizations like NEPAD and the African Union will be
critical for the management of the regional “hardware” listed above and
for the key “software” of international economic integration that is fos-
tered by harmonizing cross-border policies and procedures, including cus-
toms policies, macroeconomic policies, and the joint management of major
ecosystems such as international watersheds. In light of their importance
for ending the poverty trap in Africa, these supranational organizations
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required for individual countries.
Investing in Global Public Goods
In addition to aid and trade, many of Africa’s challenges in agriculture,
health, the environment, and access to energy services will require break-
throughs in science and technology. Examples of promising technologies
that could help Africa achieve the MDGs include new vaccines or treat-
ments for malaria and HIV/AIDS, improved agricultural varieties and
cropping systems for rain-fed and drought-prone agriculture, low-cost
information and communications technologies, and low-cost water treat-
ment and puriﬁcation technologies. Private markets in industrial countries
are able to produce development-stage and, to a lesser extent, research-
stage science, but those in poor countries cannot. Even though these mar-
ket failures have been understood for some time, the international system
has so far not responded adequately. Appropriate solutions could consist
of global coordinating mechanisms based on one of the following models:
precommitment purchase agreements,106 prizes,107 public-private partner-
ships based on contractual terms that would ensure free access to intellec-
tual properties generated through publicly funded research,108 and direct
ﬁnancing of research.
Despite several efforts, global research into areas critical to African
development remains woefully underfunded. For example, the annual
operating budget of $400 million for the worldwide network of sixteen
tropical agricultural research centers known as the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is minuscule compared
with the research and development (R&D) budgets of the world’s six
largest agrobiotech companies, estimated at roughly $3 billion a year.109
The budget of the CGIAR system as well as of the national agricultural
research centers remains low despite considerable evidence of the high
social rates of return from R&D in tropical food production.
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global health-related R&D spending, even though such diseases account
for 90 percent of the global disease burden.110 As a result, the World Health
Organization’s Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH) rec-
ommends that annual funding for R&D into global public goods in health
(for malaria, AIDS, tuberculosis, and nutrition, among other priorities)
be increased by $3 billion by 2007 and $4 billion by 2015.111 The situa-
tion is similar in other areas that are critical to the needs of poor people.
Low-cost sanitation technologies that are adapted to local cultural prefer-
ences, ability to pay, and environmental constraints are notoriously under-
researched across the developing world.
Global science is also vitally needed to address the regional conse-
quences and risks for Africa of long-term climate change caused mainly
by rich countries’ emissions of greenhouse gases. Climate change is
likely to lead to a reduction in potential crop yields in most tropical and
sub-tropical regions of Africa, worsening food security and raising
Africa’s total need for assistance.112 A concerted global effort is required
to improve countries’ ability to mitigate and adapt to climate change
through additional investments in critical global public goods, such as
improved climate modeling and forecasting tools. These can help predict
changes in precipitation patterns so as to improve the management of
reservoirs and help African farmers adapt their cropping and irrigation
techniques accordingly.
Because African science remains severely underdeveloped, the glo-
bal science community—led by national research laboratories, universi-
ties, and national academies of science—needs to play a critical role in
developing the public goods required to overcome these constraints. In
addition to supporting R&D institutions within African countries, inter-
national donors and foundations need to increase funding to focus exist-
ing global science institutions on the unique challenges of Africa. A very
rough back-of-the-envelope estimate of the total global cost of these
public goods is likely to reach at least $6.5 billion a year. Of this, perhaps
$4 billion would be directed toward public health;113 another $1 billion
to agriculture, through a tripling of the current budget of the CGIAR;
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Africa (such as geothermal energy in East Africa and off-grid electric-
ity sources for rural Africa); and perhaps $500 million for improved
understanding of year-to-year, seasonal, and long-term climate change
in Africa.
Implications for Global Development Assistance
Planning, investing, and coordinating efforts to achieve the MDGs in
African countries stuck in poverty traps amounts to an undoubtedly
ambitious agenda. Yet we have argued that only an effort of such scale
can enable countries in tropical sub-Saharan Africa to escape the
poverty trap, and we have outlined that such an effort is feasible. The 
set of known and effective interventions that can be successfully de-
ployed at the necessary scale suggests that, in most areas, technology is
not the limiting factor. Instead, shortsighted and poorly coordinated
institutional mandates of the world’s development agencies are cur-
rently a limiting factor, but these can be realigned and better coordi-
nated fairly quickly through more-focused policies and increased
multilateral financing.
The current level of ODA is surely a limiting factor for achieving the
MDGs in the well-governed African countries. It is not only necessary but
also possible to remove this constraint. We have found that well-governed
African countries need an additional $40 or so per capita per year in de-
velopment assistance. If we supposed that 620 million Africans were to
receive that amount, it would add about $25 billion a year to the roughly
$18 billion a year provided in 2002, or more than a doubling of aid ﬂows to
the continent. That total amounts to less than 0.2 percent of the rich coun-
tries’ combined GNP. Of course, if the increment were limited only to
well-governed countries, the overall increase would be signiﬁcantly less,
perhaps a bit more than half of the $25 billion a year, depending on
where the donors draw the line.
Calculating the global increase in ODA needed for all countries to
meet the MDGs is of course even trickier, and we have not tried to do that,
either for this paper or for the UN Millennium Project to date. Still, we
can make a few observations. Perhaps 30 percent of the world’s poorest
people live in Africa. If one estimates that Africa requires around 50 per-
cent of the world’s incremental donor needs, the $25 billion or so increase
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globally for the MDGs, which in turn would signify roughly a doubling of
worldwide development assistance, from around $60 billion a year at cur-
rent rates to perhaps $110 billion a year. Again, these dollar ﬁgures are
likely to be underestimates because of the big-ticket items not costed, dol-
lar depreciation, the assumption of optimal intervention packages, and the
ongoing need for aid not directly geared toward the MDGs. Moreover, we
would add investments in a variety of global public goods, including
increased funding for specialized international agencies, such as the
World Health Organization, that have had their core budgets frozen for a
decade or more, and for increased spending on science and technology
needed for the poorest countries. The total global need might be an addi-
tional $75 billion in ODA each year.
The order of magnitude for these indicative estimates conforms well
with those reported by other recent studies. The UN High-Level Panel
on Financing for Development, chaired by former president of Mexico
Ernesto Zedillo, similarly estimated that at least $50 billion in extra
annual ODA would be required to achieve the MDGs. The U.K. govern-
ment has also recently called for “doubling aid to halve poverty.” Our
rough estimates suggest that a somewhat larger amount might be needed,
but still within the same general range.
The bottom line, however, is how small even these “large” numbers
really are. Adding to the many promises of the rich world before and
since, the 2002 Monterrey Consensus includes a commitment of the
world’s industrial countries “to make concrete efforts towards the target
of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing
countries.... ” (pp. 9–10). With a combined GNP of around $27 trillion,
the donor countries of the OECD have in effect committed to donor ﬂows
on the order of $190 billion, compared with actual ﬂows of roughly
$60 billion, or around 0.2 percent of GNP. Even an additional $75 billion
a year would put the donor countries’ assistance at around $135 billion a
year, or 0.5 percent of their current GNP, far below their own com-
mitment. If one includes additional ODA for development assistance
above and beyond the increment needed for the MDGs, for instance to
middle-income countries, total global ODA needs are still likely to be less
than or equal to 0.7 percent of donor GNP.
To close where we began, however, large-scale aid is not sufﬁcient for
ending the poverty trap, nor is it even warranted where domestic gover-
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that can help themselves. We do not seek to pick ODA numbers out of
the air, but instead argue for true needs assessments on a country-by-
country basis. We believe that the situation in much of Africa is sufﬁciently
desperate, and that the potential benefits of increased donor-financed
investment are sufficiently high, that the world community should start
immediately in partnership with well-governed African countries to help
them to escape their poverty trap once and for all.
APPENDIX A
Recommended Intervention Packages 
and Their Components*
Area 1: Agricultural Productivity and Rural Infrastructure
Farm Production
Increasing agricultural productivity
Investments in soil health: Application of chemical fertilizers, agrofor-
estry (use of trees to replenish soil nutrients), green manure, and/or cover
crops in combination, as appropriate, depending on soil characteristics
Improved inputs*: Application of improved seeds, livestock feed, and
implements (such as plows)
Small-scale water management: Application of water management
techniques and structures, pumps, drip irrigation, wells, etc., as appropriate
Extension services and agricultural research: Provision of compre-
hensive extension services, combining technical support, farmer partici-
pation, and investment in agricultural research
Special interventions to reach women farmers: Recruitment and train-
ing of women extension workers, provision of inputs (seeds, fertilizers,
implements) targeted to reach women on an equitable basis with men
Linking farmers to markets
Storage, marketing, and agroprocessing facilities*: Construction of
warehouses to reduce postharvest losses; construction of market spaces;
provision of training and equipment to encourage small-scale agropro-
cessing industries in rural areas
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vision of microcredit services to enable farmers to access credit
Rural Transport Infrastructure
Roads
District roads: Upgrading, construction, and maintenance of paved
secondary or district roads
Feeder and community roads: Upgrading, construction, and mainte-
nance of small paved roads connecting villages and farmers to the nearest
district road
Footpaths*: Extension and improvement of footpaths connecting indi-
vidual rural farmers to feeder roads
Rural Energy Services
Thermal energy systems
Improved stoves: Distribution and maintenance or replacement of
appropriate cooking stoves (ceramic stoves, liquid petroleum gas [LPG]
stoves, ethanol stoves, charcoal, etc.)
Improved fuel inputs: Production and distribution system for appropri-
ate improved fuels (LPG, ethanol, dimethylsulfoxide [DMSO], kerosene,
etc.) including safe containers, depending on speciﬁc fuel mix available in
the country
Electricity
Electric power generation capacity: Extension, upgrading, and main-
tenance of capacity (thermal energy plants, hydropower, or geothermal
power, as appropriate) to supply electricity grids
Electric power grid: Extension of grid through high-voltage lines,
medium- to low-voltage lines (including end-user connections), and other
related infrastructure (such as transformer stations)
Off-grid electric power systems: Provision of diesel generators, hybrid
systems, or solar home systems together with necessary wiring to remote
rural communities
Access to Water and Sanitation and Water 
Management Infrastructure
Water
Water supply infrastructure: Provision and operation of infrastructure
for water supply (such as standpipes, boreholes, dug wells, and rainwater
harvesting)
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struction and operation of water storage infrastructure for drinking water
supply, agricultural water use, and hydropower; extension of large-scale
water harvesting
Integrated water resources management*: Protection and allocation
of water resources to agricultural, domestic, and industrial uses, as well
as environmental needs (“green water”) based on comprehensive assess-
ment of renewable and nonrenewable water resources
Hydrological monitoring*: Operation and extension of hydrological
monitoring systems
Sanitation
Sanitation infrastructure: Construction and operation of toilets (simple
pit latrines, ventilated improved pit latrines, septic tanks, ﬂush toilets,
etc.), including emptying of pits and safe disposal of sullage
Awareness building: Targeted awareness building measures accompa-
nying the provision of new sanitation infrastructure to ensure the choice of
the adequate technology option and proper use by all household members
Hygiene
Hygiene education: Awareness campaigns (in primary schools, through
community-based organizations, media, etc.) to promote hygienic behav-
ior, with particular focus on hand washing and personal hygiene, as well
as appropriate use of sanitation facilities and safe water storage.
Environmental Sustainability
Natural resource management
Prevention of desertiﬁcation*:  For example, improving land hus-
bandry through soil erosion control and soil fertility improvement
Forest management*: For example, implementation of sustained-
yield forest management techniques; forest plantation to satisfy demand 
for forestry products; tree seedlings and other measures to support
afforestation
Watershed management*: For example, promotion of afforestation to
protect selected water catchment areas
Management of coastal ecosystems and ﬁsheries*: To be speciﬁed in
each country
Other protected areas*: To be speciﬁed in each country
Environmental monitoring systems*: To be speciﬁed in each country
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Child health
Neonatal integrated package: Clean delivery, newborn resuscitation,
prevention of hypothermia, kangaroo care (skin-to-skin contact), anti-
biotics for infection, maternal tetanus toxoid, breastfeeding education,
hygiene education
Immunization:  Vaccines for polio, diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus,
measles, hepatitis B, Haemophilus inﬂuenzae type b, and yellow fever
Integrated management of childhood illness (IMCI): Integrated
approach to child health that focuses on the well-being of the whole child
to reduce mortality, illness, and disability and to promote improved
growth and development among children under ﬁve years of age; includes
both preventive and curative elements to address leading causes of child
mortality such as diarrheal disease, acute respiratory infection, measles,
malaria, and malnutrition
Maternal health
Antenatal care: Routine care during pregnancy, including preventive
and curative interventions such as blood pressure and weight monitoring,
treatment of infections, nutrition and smoking counseling, intermittent pre-
ventive treatment for malaria, and antiretrovirals for HIV-positive women
Skilled attendance and clean delivery: Presence of trained and regis-
tered midwives, nurses, nurse-midwives, or doctors at birth with ability to
diagnose and refer emergent complications
Emergency obstetric care: Rapidly accessible treatment for delivery
complications such as eclampsia, hemorrhage, obstructed labor, and sepsis
Safe abortion: Access to abortion counseling, safe abortion services,
and postabortion care
HIV/AIDS: prevention
Behavior change programs: Programs to encourage safer sexual
behavior including condom social marketing, peer-based education, mass
media campaigns, and school-based AIDS education
Control of sexually transmitted diseases: Routine screening and effec-
tive treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (such as syphilis, gonor-
rhea, and chlamydia)
Voluntary counseling and testing: Pre- and posttest counseling and
HIV testing
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sion of HIV and other infections that occur through sharing of nonsterile
injection equipment and drug preparations; speciﬁc programs include pro-
vision of sterile syringes and needles and drug substitution treatment
Prevention of mother-to-child transmission: Prevention of transmis-
sion of HIV from infected women to their infants during pregnancy,
labor, and delivery as well as during breastfeeding; includes short-term
antiretroviral prophylactic treatment, infant feeding counseling and sup-
port, and use of safer infant feeding methods
Blood safety interventions: Measures to reduce risk of receiving
infected blood through a transfusion, including HIV antibody screening,
protocols to avoid unnecessary blood transfusions,* and policies to
exclude high-risk donors*
HIV/AIDS: care and treatment
Antiretroviral therapy: Combination drug therapy to treat HIV
infection
Treatment of opportunistic infections: Treatment of any infection
caused by a microorganism that would not normally cause disease in the
individual but occurs in persons with abnormally functioning immune
systems (such as AIDS patients)
Orphan support: Provision of support to orphans to minimize the
impact of AIDS on their lives; includes school fee support, provision of
orphanages, and community support
Tuberculosis
BCG vaccine: Vaccine using Calmette-Guérin bacillus for tuberculosis
Directly Observed Treatment—Short-Course: Internationally recom-
mended tuberculosis control strategy combining ﬁve elements: political
commitment, microscopy services, drug supplies, surveillance and moni-
toring systems, and use of highly efﬁcacious regimes with direct observa-
tion of treatment
Malaria
Insecticide-treated nets and curtains: Mosquito nets that are treated
with insecticide, providing a physical and chemical barrier to mosquitoes
and shortening the mosquito’s life span
Artemisinin combination treatment: Combination of drugs used to treat
ﬁrst-line-drug-resistant falciparum malaria, which is now widespread in
Africa
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Nutrition
Nutrition for infants: Complementary feeding (food additional to
breast milk) for infants aged seven to twenty-four months
Nutrition for children attending school: Provision of school meals with
locally produced foods
Nutrition for women in reproductive age group: Introduction of 
community-based programs to provide micronutrient supplementation for
adolescent girls and women of childbearing age
Food fortiﬁcation: Introduction of fortiﬁcation for the entire popula-
tion (adding micronutrients to foods, for example by using iodized salt)
Emergency food assistance
Direct assistance in food-scarce areas: Food-for-work programs and/
or direct food aid
Family planning
Counseling on contraception and family spacing: Information and
education on beneﬁts and methods of family planning
Provision of modern contraceptive methods: Program to ensure uni-
versal access to modern contraceptive methods including sterilization
(male or female), intrauterine devices, long-acting hormonal methods




School infrastructure: Provision of schools, including classrooms, 
toilets (especially girls’ toilets), furniture, and transportation facilities
Teachers: Recruitment of teachers, especially female teachers, with
provision of incentives (such as housing in rural areas where applicable
and adequate salaries) and ensuring preservice and regular in-service
training
Learning materials: Provision of textbooks and other learning materi-
als such as stationery
Curriculum reform: Implementation of curriculum reform, where nec-
essary, to improve education content*
Demand-side incentives: Provision of uniforms, school meals (and/or
take-home food rations where needed), special targeted subsidies to girls
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conditional cash transfers to parents (if appropriate) to reduce the oppor-
tunity cost of children attending school and increase attendance
Secondary education
School infrastructure: Provision of schools, including classrooms, toi-
lets (especially girls’ toilets), furniture, transportation facilities, and other
facilities such as libraries, laboratories, and sports facilities
Teachers: Recruitment of teachers, especially female teachers, with
provision of incentives (such as housing in rural areas where applicable
and adequate salaries) and ensuring adequate preservice and in-service
training
Learning materials: Provision of adequate textbooks and other learn-
ing materials such as stationery
Curriculum reform*: Implementation of curriculum reform, where
necessary, to improve education content, with a focus on vocational and
nonformal training as necessary to prepare students for transition to work
Demand-side incentives: Provision of uniforms, school meals (and/or
take-home food rations where needed), special targeted subsidies to girls
and other vulnerable populations (such as certain ethnic groups), and con-
ditional cash transfers to parents (if appropriate) to reduce the opportunity
cost of children attending school and increase attendance
Adult literacy
Adult literacy programs: Implementation of adult literacy programs
through trainers and volunteers and accompanied by mass media cam-
paigns to increase awareness of the importance of literacy
Hard-to-reach children
Special packages for hard-to-reach populations*: Examples include
introduction of distance education and emergency schooling in conﬂict
areas
Area 4: Slum Upgrading and Urban Management
Urban Infrastructure and Slum Upgrading
Slum upgrading
Shelter*: Upgrading and construction of houses
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walks, street lighting, storm drainage, and communications infrastructure
within slums
Tenure
Security of tenure*: Improving the security of tenure through non-
eviction legislation, legitimized occupancy, or formal title
Enforcement of improved land tenure legislation*: Legal protection
and enforcement of slum dwellers’ rights
Citywide urban planning and management
Urban infrastructure*: Planning of urban infrastructure (roads, foot-
paths, sidewalks, street lighting, stormwater drainage, bus lanes, and
other transport infrastructure)
Basic services*: Provision of basic services (such as refuse collection
and solid waste disposal, policing and security, and ﬁre protection)
Pollution control*: Controlling pollution of air and water




Urban roads: Upgrading, construction, and maintenance of urban roads
Infrastructure for mass transport systems*: For example, bus lanes
Footpaths*: Extension and improvement of footpaths within cities
Urban Energy Services
Thermal energy systems
Improved stoves: Distribution and maintenance or replacement of
appropriate cooking stoves (ceramic stoves, LPG stoves, ethanol stoves,
charcoal, etc.)
Improved fuel inputs: Production and distribution system for appropri-
ate improved fuels (LPG, ethanol, DMSO, kerosene, etc.), including safe
containers, depending on speciﬁc fuel mix available in the country
Electricity
Electric power generation capacity: Extension, upgrading, and mainte-
nance of electric power generation capacity (thermal energy plants, hydro-
power, or geothermal power, as appropriate) to supply electric power grids
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medium- to low-voltage lines (including end-user connections), and other
related infrastructure (such as transformer stations)
Urban Water Supply and Sanitation
Water
Water supply infrastructure: Provision and operation of infrastructure
for water supply (for example, household connections, standpipes, bore-
holes, and rainwater harvesting)
Hydrological monitoring*: Operation and extension of hydrological
monitoring systems
Sanitation
Sanitation infrastructure: Construction and operation of toilets (simple
pit latrines, ventilated improved pit latrines, septic tanks, ﬂush toilets,
etc.) and sewers, including emptying of pits and safe disposal of sullage
Sewage treatment: Construction and operation of simple sewage and
other wastewater treatment facilities (such as waste stabilization ponds or
other forms of primary treatment) where needed in dense urban settle-
ments or because of speciﬁc environmental concerns (such as eutrophica-
tion of freshwater lakes)
Awareness building: Targeted awareness building measures accompa-
nying the provision of new sanitation infrastructure to ensure the choice
of the adequate technology option and proper use by all household
members
Hygiene
Hygiene education: Awareness campaigns (in primary schools, through
community-based organization, media, etc.) to promote hygienic behav-
ior, with particular focus on hand washing and personal hygiene, as well
as appropriate use of sanitation facilities and safe water storage
Urban Environmental Management
Pollution control
Air pollution control*: To be speciﬁed in each country
Water pollution control*: For example, industrial wastewater treat-
ment to complement sewage treatment, as necessary
Solid waste and soil pollution control*: Construction and maintenance
of technically sound landﬁlls
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Private sector development
Export processing zones*: Provision of export processing zones, indus-
trial parks, and other designated areas for private sector development
Industrial promotion activities*:  Supportive policies, including tax
concessions and grants, as well as provision of additional infrastructure
for development of manufacturing and service industries
Area 5: Science, Technology, and Innovation
Science and technology institutions
Science and technology advice*:  Creation of independent body
charged with providing scientific advice and technology forecasting to
policymakers
Higher education*: Extension and maintenance of higher education
system, with a particular focus on science and engineering education
Science and technology research*: Extension and maintenance of cen-
ters of excellence for scientiﬁc research, including the ﬁnancing of
research at universities and the establishment of science parks
Information and communications technologies
Telecommunications infrastructure*:  Provision of telecommunica-
tions infrastructure, including international and trunk ﬁber infrastructure;
provision of connectivity to hospitals and schools
Area 6: Gender Equality
Reproductive health rights and services
Awareness of and access to reproductive health rights and services:
Legislation and awareness campaigns to decriminalize and enable safe
access to abortions, to protect the rights of women to plan their families,
to enable access to safe contraceptives, and to discourage female genital
mutilation and other harmful practices
Access to property rights and work
Equal access to and treatment in work: Provision and enforcement of
equal opportunity legislation,* legislation promoting gender-sensitive
policies such as provision of maternity and dependent care leave and
training,* and support programs for women entrepreneurs and young girls
training to transition to work
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port to provide and protect women’s equal rights to property and other
inherited and acquired assets
Security
Security for girls and women from violence: Legislation and adminis-
trative actions to protect women against violence, promotion of aware-
ness of women’s right to seek redress, protection from perpetrators of
violence (through access to shelters, services, etc.), and mechanisms to
dispense justice to perpetrators
Participation and institutional reform
Political representation*: Mechanisms (such as quotas and reserva-
tions) to allow for adequate representation at all levels of government
along with adequate training
Involvement of women’s groups at the village level*: Recognition of
and support to women’s groups organized at the village level to encour-
age women to be partners in the design and delivery of public services
National women’s machineries (NWMs)*: Legislative and ﬁnancial
support to NWMs (deﬁned by the United Nations as “a single body or
complex organized system of bodies, often under different authorities, but
recognized by the government as the institution dealing with the promo-
tion of the status of women”)
Data collection and monitoring
Gender-disaggregated data*: Collection of gender-disaggregated sta-
tistics on health, education outcomes, access to assets and infrastructure,
conditions of work and employment, political representation, and gender-
speciﬁc violence




National highways and international transport corridors: Upgrading,
construction, and maintenance of paved highways for bulk transport
Railroads
Railroad infrastructure*: Extension, upgrading, and maintenance of
railroads, including rolling stock
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Port infrastructure*: Construction and modernization of container port
facilities; dredging and other maintenance of ports
Integration of transport systems*: Construction and maintenance of
railroad and truck terminals for containerized freight
Energy Infrastructure
Thermal energy systems
Petroleum reﬁning and storage*: As appropriate, rehabilitation and
extension of petroleum reﬁning, pipeline, and storage systems
Gas and oil pipelines*:  Construction and maintenance of regional
pipelines to improve supply of fossil fuels (examples include the West
African Gas Pipeline and the Kenya-Uganda oil pipeline)
Electricity
Geothermal electric power plants*: Construction of geothermal elec-
tric power plants in East Africa and parts of southern Africa
Regional electricity pool*: Extension of international electric power
grid through international high-voltage lines and pooling of electricity
grids to reduce peak generating capacity need
Trade Integration and Government Cooperation
Trade
Trade liberalization and harmonization*: Opening of markets for
trade and ﬁnance, harmonization of standards, and facilitation of customs
procedures
Government cooperation
Supranational institutions for regional public goods*: Establishment
of regional institutions and strengthening of regional cooperation on
migration,  ﬁnance, monetary policies, watershed management, energy
policy, and other areas
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Critical Intervention Areas for MDG Targets 
and Their Effects*
Income Poverty (MDG 1, target 1)
Agriculture
—Increasing agricultural productivity directly raises the incomes of
the rural poor.
Nutrition
—Better nutrition contributes to human capital accumulation and
improved labor productivity.
Education
—Education increases human capital.
—Education is linked to lower fertility rates, which in turn are linked
to increases in economic growth per capita.
Gender Equality
—Awareness of and access to reproductive health rights and services
enable and empower women to plan their families, leading to lower fertil-
ity rates and reduced poverty.
—Empowerment through access to work, property rights, political rep-
resentation, and safety from violence leads to increased participation of
women in economic activity.
Health
—Improved health has pervasive direct and indirect effects on raising
both the level and the growth rate of income.
Environment
—Many poor people depend on natural resources for their livelihoods.
Improving natural resource management can sustain or even raise their
incomes.
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—Improved water supply for productive activities can raise economic
growth through agriculture and the urban manufacturing and service
sectors.
Slum Upgrading and Urban Planning
—Providing security of tenure can improve labor market participation
and access to credit markets.
—Urban infrastructure, including transport systems, is necessary for
establishing manufacturing and service industries.
Science and Technology
—Science and technology institutions improve technological learning
in society and improve the adoption of technology by the private sector.
—Higher education can open new employment opportunities.
Energy
—Access to electric power and improved thermal energy systems is
necessary for manufacturing, service, or cottage industries.
Transport
—Roads, railroads, and ports lower transport costs and thereby
increase the real incomes of the poor.
—In urban areas improved transport infrastructure supports manufac-
turing and service industries, contributing to employment.
Hunger (MDG 1, target 2)
Agriculture
—Increasing agricultural productivity through investments in soil
health, water management, extension services, and improving food stor-
age infrastructure increases food availability for subsistence farmers.
Nutrition
—Nutrition interventions are needed for vulnerable populations and to
address micronutrient deﬁciencies.
—Direct food assistance in food-scarce areas alleviates short-term
hunger.
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—Literacy contributes to better management of nutritional needs and
farm production.
Gender Equality
—Land rights allow women to increase agricultural production.
—Increased access to work and higher incomes enable women to pur-
chase adequate food for themselves and their families.
—Equal access to productive inputs increases plot yields.
Health
—Reducing parasitic and infectious disease burden improves nutrition.
Environment
—Improved water resource management and protection of water
catchment areas can raise crop yields.
—Biodiversity protection sustains pollination and seed dispersal
mechanisms necessary for agricultural production.
Water and Sanitation
—Safe drinking water reduces the incidence of water-borne diseases,
which cause malnourishment.
—Drinking water supplied through wells and boreholes can help irri-
gate ﬁelds during unforeseen droughts.
—Access to sanitation reduces the incidence of diarrheal disease and
thereby increases nutrient uptake.
—Integrated water resources management sustains adequate water
supply for agriculture.
—Water storage and water management infrastructure improve water
management for agriculture.
Slum Upgrading and Urban Planning
—Slum upgrading and accompanying interventions help raise incomes
and reduce urban hunger.
—Improved transport infrastructure lowers the cost of food products,
further reducing hunger.
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—Increased agricultural research is critical for improving seed vari-
eties, cropping systems, pest control, and water management, to increase
agricultural productivity, thus reducing hunger.
—Increased access to higher education can help increase the number of
agricultural extension workers.
—ICT improves farmers’ market information, raising agricultural
production.
Energy
—Improved access to electricity and liquid fuels can power diesel
pumps for irrigation, facilitate mechanization, and power agroprocessing
machinery, thus increasing agricultural output and reducing hunger.
—Improved energy services lower transportation and marketing costs,
which reduces food prices.
—Access to improved cooking fuels is necessary to ensure safe cook-
ing of food.
Transport
—Footpaths and feeder, district, and national roads lower the cost of
agricultural inputs, increase farmgate prices, and facilitate marketing,
which can increase agricultural production.
—Improved transport infrastructure reduces postharvest losses through
accelerated transport of products to markets.
Primary Education (MDG 2, target 3)
Education Interventions
—Increase access to improved primary and secondary schools as well
as adult literacy programs through provision of infrastructure; hiring,
improved remuneration, and training of teachers; provision of learning
materials; curriculum reform; and demand-side interventions to retain
children in school.
Agriculture
—Agricultural interventions to improve soils, seeds, and water man-
agement raise rural incomes and reduce the time young children spend in
the ﬁeld, freeing them to attend school.
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—Nutrition interventions for infants improve cognitive development
and improve learning outcomes in the future.
Gender Equality
—Maternal education contributes strongly to higher primary
enrollment.
Health
—Improved health enhances educational outcomes by improving cog-
nitive abilities and attendance rates.
—AIDS prevention and treatment reduce the disease’s impact on
teacher attendance and attrition.
—AIDS prevention and treatment reduce the number of orphans, who
are less likely to complete primary education.
Environment
—Improved natural resource management can free up children’s time
and increase school attendance.
Water and Sanitation
—Improved access to water frees up children’s time, thus allowing
them to attend school.
—Improved health through sanitation and hygiene reduces school
absenteeism.
—Girls’ toilets in schools can increase their enrollment and comple-
tion rates.
Slum Upgrading and Urban Planning
—Security of land tenure and a ﬁxed address are often necessary for
children to be allowed to attend school.
Science and Technology
—Higher education is essential to training secondary school teachers
and provides additional incentives to complete primary and secondary
school.
—ICT infrastructure can improve the quality of education.
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—Access to electric power and improved cooking fuels lowers time
spent by children (especially girls) collecting fuel wood, thus facilitating
school attendance.
—Improved access to liquid fuels is necessary to render mechanized
school transport more affordable.
—Electriﬁcation permits children to read and study longer, thus
improving school outcomes.
Transport
—Improved transport infrastructure and services increase incentives
for teachers to work in rural areas.
—Feeder roads and footpaths reduce the time it takes for children to
reach school and allow them to travel farther, raising enrollment rates.
—Improved roads and footpaths reduce the time required for house-
holds to fetch fuel and water and to carry out other tasks, lowering the
opportunity cost of children attending school.
Gender Equality (MDG 3, target 4)
Direct Interventions
—Programs to reduce violence against women, improve their property
and other rights, ensure full access to reproductive health services and
contraception, and improve women’s participation in decisionmaking
processes.
Agriculture
—Improved soils, seeds, and water provision can reduce the time girls
spend in the ﬁeld, freeing them to attend school.
—Increased agricultural production increases the incomes of women
farmers.
Nutrition
—Nutrition interventions for girls (infants and children) lead to better
health and education outcomes.
Education
—Education contributes to increased employment opportunities,
improved decisionmaking, and empowerment of women more broadly.
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—Family planning services appear to improve employment opportuni-
ties for women, strengthen partner relationships, and provide a greater
sense of well-being.
Environment
—Women beneﬁt disproportionately from improved management of
natural resources, including through time savings and reduced transport
burden.
Water and Sanitation
—Improved access to water generates time savings for women and
girls.
—Improved access to water reduces the need to carry heavy loads over
long distances, thus improving women’s health.
—Increasing access to toilets reduces women’s exposure to harass-
ment and improves personal hygiene and well-being.
Slum Upgrading and Urban Planning
—Women beneﬁt disproportionately from slum upgrading, since it
reduces their transport burden and time poverty, improves their health,
and provides them with additional income generating opportunities.
Energy
—Improved access to electricity and fuels reduces the time poverty of
women and lowers their daily transport burden.
—Improved access to energy creates additional employment opportu-
nities for women.
Transport
—Improved transport infrastructure reduces women’s time poverty
and transport burden.
—Roads improve communication and lower transactions costs, thus
increasing employment opportunities for women.
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Health Interventions
—Provide the neonatal integrated package of interventions, immuniza-
tion, the integrated management of childhood illness (IMCI), and the
range of preventive approaches to public health (such as mass distribution
of insecticide-treated bednets).
Agriculture
—Increased rural incomes and food availability lead to improved
health outcomes.
Nutrition
—Nutrition interventions for pregnant women lead to higher birth
weight, an important determinant of child survival.
—Micronutrient supplementation and complementary feeding reduce
child mortality.
Education
—Secondary education increases the age of marriage, lowers fertility
rates, and increases care seeking for child illnesses.
—Adult literacy programs increase awareness of the causes and pre-
vention of child mortality.
Gender Equality
—Women’s empowerment leads in multiple ways to greater awareness
of child health issues.
Environment
—Reducing pollution of water and air can lower child morbidity and
mortality.
Water and Sanitation
—Access to sanitation and improved hygiene reduce the incidence of
waterborne disease.
Slum Upgrading and Urban Planning
—Slum upgrading, improved urban infrastructure, and access to basic
services (including solid waste disposal) can reduce exposure to pollu-
tants and thereby reduce child mortality rates.
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Science and Technology
—ICT improves diffusion of hygiene education and thereby lowers
child mortality.
—Access to higher education increases the supply of health workers.
Energy
—Reducing indoor air pollution through improved cooking fuels and
stoves decreases respiratory infections.
—Improved access to energy allows households to boil water, thus
reducing the incidence of waterborne diseases.
Transport
—Improved transport infrastructure increases access to health care
clinics and services and reduces costs for health care workers serving in
rural areas.
Maternal Mortality (MDG 5, target 6)
Health Interventions
—Ensure access to emergency obstetrical care, antenatal care, skilled
attendance, and clean delivery, as well as safe abortion.
Agriculture
—Increased rural incomes and food intake lead to improved health
outcomes.
Nutrition
—Nutrition interventions such as iron supplementation for women of
reproductive age reduce risk during pregnancy and childbirth.
Education
—Secondary education increases the age of marriage, contraception
use, and access to prenatal care and safe delivery, all of which reduce
maternal mortality.
—Adult literacy programs increase awareness of the causes and pre-
vention of maternal mortality.
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—Women’s empowerment leads to greater effective demand for pre-
natal care and safe delivery.
Water and Sanitation
—Running water and sanitation facilities are essential for provision of
prenatal care and emergency obstetric care.
—Access to sanitation and hygienic behavior improve women’s
health.
Slum Upgrading and Urban Planning
—Slum upgrading and security of land tenure improve women’s
access to health systems and emergency obstetric care.
Science and Technology
—ICT is critical for providing adequate access to emergency obstetric
care.
—Access to higher education increases the supply of health workers.
Energy
—Improved access to energy services improves communication and
transport, which are critical for emergency obstetric care.
—Modern energy services reduce the costs for health care workers
serving in rural areas.
Transport
—Feeder roads are critical for providing timely access to emergency
obstetric care.
—Improved transport infrastructure reduces the costs for health care
workers serving in rural areas.
HIV/AIDS (MDG 6, target 7)
Health Interventions
—Provide comprehensive HIV/AIDS prevention programs, orphan
support, voluntary counseling and testing, harm reduction for drug users,
prevention of mother-to-child transmission, antiretroviral treatment, and
treatment of opportunistic infections.
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—Increased agricultural incomes improve access to prevention
services.
Nutrition
—Adequate nutrition interventions can improve survival and quality of
life of patients with HIV/AIDS.
Education
—Education and literacy programs increase awareness of ways to pre-
vent and treat HIV/AIDS.
Gender Equality
—Women’s empowerment leads to greater effective demand for HIV/
AIDS prevention and treatment, including the ability to negotiate safe
sexual practices.
Water and Sanitation
—Improving access to clean water and sanitation improves the nutri-
tional status of HIV/AIDS patients.
Slum Upgrading and Urban Planning
—Slum upgrading and security of land tenure improve access to HIV/
AIDS treatment and prevention.
Science and Technology
—Scientiﬁc research can improve the diagnosis and treatment of
HIV/AIDS.
—ICT is critical for media-based HIV/AIDS prevention.
—Access to higher education increases the supply of health workers.
Energy
—Electricity and modern energy services support functioning health
clinics and hospitals.
—Modern energy services increase incentives for health workers to
work in rural areas.
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—Improved transport infrastructure facilitates treatment and preven-
tion of HIV/AIDS.
—Improved transport infrastructure reduces costs for health workers
serving in rural areas.
Malaria and Other Major Diseases (MDG 6, target 8)
Health Interventions
—Combine comprehensive use of insecticide-treated bednets, indoor-
residual spraying where appropriate, effective malaria treatment (using
artemisinin combination therapies where appropriate), and epidemic con-
trol measures.
—Contain tuberculosis through promotion of vaccines, Directly Ob-
served Treatment Short-Course (DOTS) protocol, and DOTS-Plus for
multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis.
Agriculture
—An increase in agricultural incomes improves access to and informa-
tion about ways of preventing and treating malaria.
Education
—Education and literacy programs increase awareness of ways to pre-
vent and treat malaria and tuberculosis.
Gender Equality
—Women’s empowerment leads to greater effective demand for insec-
ticide-treated nets and malaria and tuberculosis treatment.
Environment
—In some instances environmental control can contribute to contain-
ing malaria.
Water and Sanitation
—In some instances improved water management in urban areas can
contribute toward containing mosquito breeding sites and transmission.
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—Improving housing and urban water management infrastructure can
reduce the incidence of malaria and especially tuberculosis (which is
transmitted in overcrowded slum conditions).
—Slum upgrading improves access to appropriate malaria and tuber-
culosis treatment.
Science and Technology
—Research is necessary to develop new drugs and diagnostics for
malaria and tuberculosis.
—Access to higher education increases the supply of health workers.
Energy
—Electricity and modern energy services improve health care.
—Modern energy services reduce costs for health care workers serving
in rural areas.
Transport
—Improved transport infrastructure reduces the cost of distributing
bednets.
—Improved transport infrastructure increases incentives for health
care workers to work in rural areas.
Access to Essential Medicines (MDG 8, target 17)
Health Interventions
—Improve supply and distribution systems for essential medicines
together with strengthened quality control and quality assurance and pro-
grams to promote rational use.
Agriculture
—An increase in agricultural incomes makes essential medicines more
affordable.
Education
—Education and literacy programs increase access to and appropriate
use of essential medicines.
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—Women’s empowerment leads to greater effective demand for essen-
tial medicines of good quality.
Science and Technology
—Research increases the total stock and effectiveness of essential
medicines.
Transport
—Improved transport infrastructure lowers the cost of essential medi-
cines and improves access.
Reverse Loss of Environmental Resources (MDG 7, target 9)
Environmental Interventions
—Improve management of natural resources through market mecha-
nisms, strengthened regulation and enforcement, and investments in the
management of critical ecosystems.
Agriculture
—Investments in soil health replenish soils and prevent further land
degradation.
—Intensive agricultural production is an alternative to slash-and-burn
and to the deforestation that results.
—Small-scale water management can restore water tables and prevent
runoff.
Gender Equality
—Equal access to property rights allows women, as primary users, to
manage natural resources in a sustainable manner.
Health
—Family planning reduces total fertility rates, thus mitigating popula-
tion pressures on the environment.
Water and Sanitation
—Improved sanitation and sewage treatment can reduce environmen-
tal pollution.
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water” necessary for ecosystem functioning.
—Hydrological monitoring systems can help protect aquifers and
freshwater ecosystems from excessive withdrawals.
Slum Upgrading and Urban Planning
—Slum upgrading and improved urban water and waste management
infrastructure reduce environmental pollution.
Science and Technology
—Research can improve natural resource management (including
management of freshwater ecosystems and wetlands, biodiversity
conservation).
Energy
—Access to modern cooking fuels reduces demand for biomass cook-
ing fuels, thus reducing pressure on marginal lands and forests.
—Improved energy services reduce outdoor air pollution.
—Improved energy services can reduce carbon emissions.
Water and Sanitation (MDG 7, target 10)
Water and Sanitation Interventions
—Provide, operate, and maintain water and sanitation infrastructure
and services in conjunction with behavior change programs to improve
household hygiene.
Agriculture
—Small-scale water management increases water availability for rural
farmers.
Education
—Education and literacy programs improve hygiene.
Gender Equality
—Political representation allows women to ensure that access to water
is a priority in local decisionmaking.
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—Improved management of wetlands, water catchment areas, and
freshwater ecosystems is critical for ensuring access to drinking water.
—Control of industrial pollution improves drinking water quality.
Slum Upgrading and Urban Planning
—Slum upgrading reduces water pollution and improves drinking
water quality.
—Improved urban infrastructure ensures the separation of sewage
from drinking water supplies.
Science and Technology
—Research can help improve sanitation and water management
techniques.
—Access to higher education increases the supply of trained workers
to design and manage water supply and sewer infrastructure.
Energy
—Electricity and improved access to modern fuels are necessary to
power water supply infrastructure and water treatment systems.
Transport
—Improved transport infrastructure facilitates provision, operation,
and maintenance of water supply and sanitation systems.
—Improved transport systems reduce the costs of providing hygiene
education through community workers.
Improve Lives of Slum Dwellers (MDG 7, target 11)
Direct Interventions
—Scale up slum upgrading programs with the support of improved
urban planning and investments in core urban infrastructure as well as
basic services.
Agriculture
—Investing in urban agriculture increases agricultural productivity and
the incomes of slum dwellers.
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—Nutrition interventions improve the health outcomes of urban popu-
lations.
Education
—Education and literacy programs improve the employment prospects
of slum dwellers.
Gender Equality
—Equal access to property rights, political representation, and security
for girls and women allows women living in slums to improve their lives
and the lives of their families.
Health
—Access to health services reduces the burden of ill health for slum
dwellers.
Environment
—Improving solid waste disposal and water treatment can improve
health outcomes.
Water and Sanitation
—Improved access to water supply and sanitation services can reduce
household expenditure on water.
—Sewage treatment can further improve health outcomes in urban
areas.
—Storm water drainage systems are improved through sanitation
infrastructure, thus minimizing the risk of ﬂooding.
Science and Technology
—Higher education provides new employment opportunities for the
urban poor.
—ICT reduces the cost of income-generating activities.
Energy
—Improving access to electricity and modern fuels lowers indoor air
pollution.
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ture on energy services, thus raising incomes.
—Improved energy services lower the cost of urban transport.
Transport
—Improved rural transport infrastructure reduces the cost of food in
urban areas, thus increasing real incomes.
—Improved urban transport infrastructure is critical to enhancing
income-generating opportunities as well as access to social services.
—Proper sidewalks and curbing are critical to reduce trafﬁc deaths.
Information and Communications Technology (MDG 8, target 18)
Direct Interventions
—Strengthen science advisory mechanisms, invest in higher education
and research, promote private sector development, and improve access to
communications technologies.
Agriculture
—Increased agricultural incomes improve access to ICT.
Education
—Secondary education prepares students to provide, use, and manage
ICT.
Energy
—Electricity is necessary to power ICT applications and to operate
research institutions.
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Discussion
Michael Kremer: This is an interesting and indeed provocative paper,
arguing for a large increase in foreign aid to Africa to help the continent
escape from a poverty trap. I agree that aid should be increased, but I will
take issue with a few of the building blocks in the authors’ analysis and
will suggest an alternative case for aid. In particular, I will argue that the
limited empirical evidence seems just as consistent with conventional
growth models, in which government quality and policies determine
steady-state income, as with the idea that Africa is caught in a poverty
trap. This should not be taken as an argument against aid, however,
because there is little evidence for the “new Washington consensus” that
aid cannot work in areas with weak governments and that conditionality is
a failure. In fact, the case for aid may be greater where governments are
doing a poor job. I will conclude by arguing that planning development
expenditure around the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) risks
generating distortions. 
Poverty trap models suggest that if countries can get over a certain
income threshold, they will take off economically. These models there-
fore suggest that aid can have a powerful effect by raising countries over
this threshold. The basic microeconomic case for poverty traps typically
involves nonconvexities. However, even if nonconvexities exist at the
microeconomic level (for example, lumpy capital investments), it is not
clear that they exist at the macroeconomic level. If a certain level of trans-
port and communications infrastructure is needed for development, for
example, one could imagine a country starting out by building this level
of infrastructure in a single port or capital city and then expanding out-
ward. This might eliminate nonconvexities at the macroeconomic level. 
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would empirically distinguish a poverty trap model from a conventional
model in which government policy determines steady-state income. In
this model, countries converge to steady-state income from above or from
below, depending on initial income. One can consider both micro-
economic and macroeconomic approaches. 
There are certainly some people in Africa with money to invest, and in
some poverty trap models those people should be able to set up very pros-
perous enterprises, hire more and more labor, and expand their enterprises
rapidly. However, we do not see that happening. In fact, many people
with money in Africa move it to Europe or elsewhere rather than take
advantage of the potentially huge returns available under poverty trap
models to people who can reach a certain scale of investment. 
At the macroeconomic level, poverty trap models suggest that African
countries that attain a threshold income level should then take off. Again,
this does not appear to be the case. In 1998 Gabon’s GNP per capita was
$3,870, but by 2002 its GNP per capita had fallen to $3,060.1 In 1980
Nigeria’s GNP per capita was almost $1,000, but in 2002 it was only
$300. Many argue that governments tend to waste oil revenue, but, in a
pure poverty trap model, cases such as Nigeria are difﬁcult to explain.
Nor is the problem limited to countries with oil: consider the case of Zam-
bia, where GNP per capita was $680 in 1981 but $340 in 2002. Nor is it
limited to minerals in general: Côte d’Ivoire had for a while a relatively
high income per capita for Africa, but then the economy collapsed. Zim-
babwe had a GDP per capita of over $1,100 in 1982, but it had fallen to
$480 by 2002 and is presumably below that now. South Africa’s income
per capita is certainly above the level associated with poverty traps in this
paper, but it has not taken off economically.2 One relatively well off
African country with good economic performance is Botswana, but with
strong economic policies, democracy, and ethnic homogeneity, its experi-
ence is just as consistent with the story that good government is central as
with the poverty trap story. 
Under a conventional model, countries experiencing a large negative
shock should grow quickly once conditions change for the better, whereas
in poverty trap models they will stagnate. In fact, the fastest-growing
countries in Africa in recent years have been Uganda and Mozambique,
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lishment of a government with good economic policies. (It is worth not-
ing that aid has played a major role in each case.)
The authors argue that indicators of government quality in Africa are
no worse than expected given income levels. The authors perform a ser-
vice here by challenging stereotypes that many people have about Africa.
For example, many seem to feel that Africa is uniquely mired in tribal
violence. Yet when one compares the body count in Africa with that of
Europe during the twentieth century, it is hard to make the case that
Africans are more subject to ethnic strife than Europeans.
However, I do not think that one can argue from the authors’ regres-
sion results that government policy is not fairly fundamental to Africa’s
problems. First, it is not clear that traditional measures are well suited to
measuring the problems of government in Africa. For example, these
measures are not designed to pick up the absence of government. Somalia
does not have a central government, and even stable countries like
Uganda or Kenya have areas where the government provides little secu-
rity. Another issue is that respondents in corruption surveys may be
giving judgments relative to expectations, and they may have low expec-
tations for Africa. 
More fundamentally, even if African countries do not have worse gov-
ernments than would be expected given their income level, this does not
imply that government quality does not determine income. In a model in
which government quality determines income, African governments
should be no worse than expected, given their income. If other factors (for
example, geography) also contribute to African poverty, one would
expect that African governments would look good relative to their
income. Thus the authors’ regression results are consistent with a model
in which government quality and economic policies are the primary deter-
minants of income, with other factors, such as the geographic factors that
Sachs has discussed in previous work, also playing a role. 
Although I ﬁnd it quite plausible that Africa’s poverty is due as much
to poor economic policy and bad government as to a poverty trap, I sup-
port the paper’s call for large increases in aid. I do so largely because I
reject the current consensus in the development policy community that
aid will only be effective if it is given to good governments and that
conditionality has failed. The empirical evidence for both these proposi-
tions is weak. 
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“bad” governments would be much more effective. Consider, for exam-
ple, a government that is neither vaccinating children nor adequately
ﬁnancing primary education, but rather is spending all of its resources on
palaces. The fact that kids are not being vaccinated or sent to primary
school implies that high-value investments are available in the country for
potential donors. There are certainly incentive issues in giving large
amounts of aid to bad governments, but aid need not be given to govern-
ments. Donors could provide aid to whatever institutions in the country
are educating children, whether they be private schools or nonproﬁt orga-
nizations. Such an arrangement may well strengthen alternative power
bases and even help promote reform.
It is also unclear to me why we have given up on conditionality. The
classic poster child for the failures of conditionality was supposed to be
Kenya. Many observers, including the Economist, have retold the story of
how President Daniel arap Moi took advantage of soft-hearted or weak
willed donors at the IMF and the World Bank: Moi promises to reform,
donors give him money, Moi reneges on his promises; Moi later makes
another set of promises, gets more money from the donors, and reneges
again, in cycle after cycle. 
Arguably, this story has things exactly backward. Conditionality did
induce Moi to make both economic and political changes, including free-
ing the exchange rate, expanding scope for freedom of speech and cre-
ation of political parties, and instituting term limits. As a direct result of
these changes, term limits in particular, Moi is out of ofﬁce now, and
Kenya is a reasonably well functioning democracy. The idea that condi-
tionality is never effective and that governments always manipulate
donors is hard to reconcile with the idea that conditionality can actually
force a leader like Moi out of ofﬁce. Nor is such an outcome at all unique
to Kenya. There has been political reform across Africa, in large part as a
reaction to pressure from donors. 
At the same time, we should admit that we do not know very much
about what will produce growth in Africa or when that will happen. In my
view, although the case that economic policy—and, ultimately, govern-
ment quality—inﬂuence income is supported by somewhat more evidence
than the poverty trap view, we know very little about what does produce
economic growth, and even less about how aid can play a major role in
stimulating economy-wide growth. 
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The case for aid should be based not on the view that small amounts of aid
delivered the right way will somehow magically deliver rapid, economy-
wide growth, but rather on the extremely pressing human needs in the
region and the fact that amounts of aid that are extremely small by devel-
oped country standards can have a huge impact on whether families have
clean water, whether children get vaccinated, whether people have roads
to get their products to market, and so forth.
Donors should fund interventions that work. The paper lists a number
of these. In the areas where we are not sure what works, donors should try
multiple approaches, rigorously evaluate them using randomized trials,
and then fund those that are demonstrated to work. 
I agree with the authors’ point that there are plenty of useful interven-
tions that foreign aid can support. Opponents of increasing aid often refer
to capacity constraints in the recipient countries, but, in my view, these
constraints are artiﬁcial and are created by the expectation that aid must
be “sustainable.” Many in the aid community hold the view that donors
have to fund “sustainable” projects. This means that new projects and
programs have to be dreamed up every few years, and that donors are
reluctant to ﬁnance recurrent costs, such as teachers’ salaries. Abandon-
ing that view and admitting there are some things donors should fund for
at least the next ﬁfteen to twenty years would substantially loosen these
so-called capacity constraints. It is important for children to be vacci-
nated, and donors should be willing to pay for that for the next twenty
years; it is important for children to go to school, and donors should be
willing to pay for that as well. At some point, African countries will pre-
sumably take off economically, just as many other countries have that
were once considered basket cases, but it may not be for a while, and it
may not be because of anything donors do. 
The authors suggest that aid and development planning should focus
on achieving the MDGs.3 A potential upside of the MDGs is that they
help in fundraising. But a potential downside of focusing aid and devel-
opment planning on the MDGs is that it may distort how funds are spent.
I fear that the upside is not materializing, and indeed the authors point out
that donors have not provided the resources needed to achieve the MDGs.
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world’s aid agencies, I worry that the MDGs may distort development
spending, particularly aid spending. Poor countries have many needs, not
all of which ﬁt neatly within the MDGs. It is not clear why aid should be
given to meet the MDGs rather than other important objectives. For
example, the MDGs talk about reducing poverty and seem to rely on a
headcount measure of poverty. One would presumably value improve-
ments in income almost as much for someone just above an arbitrarily
drawn international poverty line as for someone just below this poverty
line. The MDGs do not seem to take this into account. 
To take another example, the MDGs assign no value to beneﬁts that
will occur sometime after the deadlines have passed. Why is this impor-
tant? Arguably, one of the most important things that can be done to
improve health in Africa is to invest in research on vaccines against dis-
eases such as malaria and AIDS. However, developing such vaccines
might take long enough that the beneﬁts would be realized after the dead-
lines. If development planning is single-mindedly focused on meeting the
MDGs, funds for this research might be cut. 
Basing national development plans around the MDGs is a risky strat-
egy. As the authors point out, meeting the MDGs in Africa would require
a great deal of external money. If that money does not materialize, coun-
tries will be left with a laundry list of everything from building reﬁneries
to vaccinations. I worry that countries may well wind up with a half-
ﬁnished reﬁnery and without the vaccinations.
Finally, in an age when development practitioners emphasize the
importance of local participation, it seems odd to establish a set of goals
through a UN process, the very unanimity of which suggests a lack of
local participation, and then to ask people at the local level to come up
with participatory ways to implement this agenda. Needs vary from coun-
try to country. 
The jury seems to be out on whether the fundraising beneﬁts of the
MDGs will outweigh the potential distortions to development planning. I
would suggest a much more modest, microeconomically based approach
to aid. Instead of setting macroeconomic goals, such as escaping from a
poverty trap or achieving the MDGs, and then planning aid around them,
it would be better to make decisions based on microeconomic evidence on
the impact of particular programs and policies. 
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persuasion by Jeffrey Sachs and his coauthors. The paper makes three
bold claims. The ﬁrst is that modern economic growth will begin in tropi-
cal Africa only when profound geographical disadvantages have been
overcome. The second is that this will require a massive, temporary pub-
lic investment program that can readily be organized around the Millen-
nium Development Goals (MDGs) as intermediate targets. The third is
that external ﬁnance represents in many cases the binding constraint on
implementing this program, and therefore on getting growth started in
Africa. 
Africa has received a lot of foreign assistance for a long time.1 Much of
the aid has been misdirected, but much has been geared to precisely the
types of intervention endorsed by the authors. One should therefore ask
two questions of the current paper. First, is the authors’ diagnosis of
“needs” signiﬁcantly better than previous or competing diagnoses? Sec-
ond, can a sharper take on needs, plus an overhaul of donor practices,
improve the effectiveness of aid by anything like the magnitude sug-
gested? My own view is that there is considerable scope for boldness in
certain well-deﬁned areas and particular countries. I believe nonetheless
that the authors have underplayed both the uncertainties in their prescrip-
tion and the constraints on an effective scaling up of aid. 
The scope of the paper is extraordinary, and I will begin by quickly
reviewing its contributions. Drawing on Sachs’ pathbreaking research
(with various coauthors) on the “human ecology” of tropical Africa, the
authors document Africa’s acute and in some cases widening disad-
vantage in agricultural productivity, transport costs, disease burden, and
demographic structure. They interpret this persistent stagnation by
appealing to a class of poverty trap models with geographically based
increasing returns. These models provide a clear rationale for a massive,
temporary infusion of external ﬁnance. To this end the authors develop a
program that, at the scale proposed, amounts to a new development strat-
egy for tropical Africa—one in which near-term efforts would focus, not
on growth per se, but on establishing the preconditions for growth. 
At the level of speciﬁc needs and interventions, the authors lay out an
impressively concrete program. They appeal to an interdisciplinary set of
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education. They cost these out on a country-speciﬁc basis for Ghana, Tan-
zania, and Uganda. In an exercise familiar to all aid practitioners but
exemplary in important respects—including its treatment of recurrent
costs and the incentive effects of user fees—they calculate a ﬁnancing
gap. The bottom line is daunting but perhaps doable: the MDGs for
income poverty, health, and education can be met in these countries
through a (ﬁrst sharply, then gradually) scaled-up commitment that would
roughly double real aid levels for a decade. In a ﬁnal section the authors
lay out a program for addressing donor shortcomings that might hamper
success. 
Perhaps the most striking bit of persuasion in the paper is its ex post
motivation of the MDGs as take-off thresholds in a big-push development
strategy. It is important that this argument not obscure two features of the
MDGs that have already proved critical in rallying global support for
increased aid to Africa. The ﬁrst is their intrinsic appeal as merit goods.
Here Sachs’ work on economic geography continues to be instrumental in
deepening our understanding of the particular deﬁcits faced by African
populations. The second is the political genius of the MDGs, as a set of
well-deﬁned targets squarely centered on poverty reduction and human
development. As the authors point out, this is an agenda that cannot easily
be rejected by any party to the aid relationship. As such it may provide a
framework for overcoming the conﬂicts of interest that have undermined
this relationship in the past. 
Let me now turn to the substance of the paper, starting with the devel-
opment strategy it proposes. This strategy has noble (even Nobel) lineage.
In 1953 future laureate W. Arthur Lewis advised the government of the
Gold Coast (soon to become Ghana) as follows. “The main obstacle to
development,” he wrote, “is the fact that agricultural productivity per man
is stagnant. Very many years will have elapsed before it becomes eco-
nomical for the government to transfer any large part of its resources
towards industrialization and away from the more urgent priorities of
agricultural productivity and public services.”2 This is precisely the
sequencing argument of the present paper. Nor is the geographical scope
of the current argument much different, because in 1953 Ghana had an
unambiguous head start in human development relative to most of tropi-
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continent.
Ghana’s early development plans decisively rejected Lewis’s advice.
Like many African leaders, Kwame Nkrumah viewed agriculture as inert
and industrialization as the way forward. That view was consistent, ironi-
cally, with Lewis’s famous 1954 paper, in which agriculture provides a
surplus that can be leveraged into capital accumulation and growth in the
industrial sector.3 But it ignored Lewis’s deeper advice that the precondi-
tions were not yet there in Ghana: agricultural productivity was too low to
generate a surplus. 
Mauritius had something closer to a Korean-style head start in the
1950s, and here Lewis’s shadow fell more heavily, although not to better
effect. In Mauritius future Nobel laureate James Meade dispensed advice
that was vintage Lewis 1954.4 This meant a disastrous ten-year detour
into import-substituting industrialization. It was only in the late 1960s
that this small island economy began to leverage its favorable precondi-
tions (and the rents from sugar preferences) into an outward-oriented
strategy based on labor-intensive textile exports. 
The strategy advanced here therefore resonates with what at least one
deep observer of the African situation saw as early as the 1950s. More-
over, although the authors do not really answer the “what next” question,
Mauritius must be the model they have in mind. This would be consistent
with the 1998 Brookings Paper by Sachs and David Bloom, which notes
the hostile environment for African agriculture and (gingerly) endorses a
move into labor-intensive manufacturing and services.5 Relative to Bloom
and Sachs 1998, the current paper says that a platform must be built ﬁrst,
in the rural economy and in human development. Relative to Lewis 1953,
the difference is one of urgency and scale: the platform should be con-
structed over the next decade, in a big push.
The contrast with Lewis 1953 highlights the central challenge this
paper throws down to donors: are they being anywhere near bold enough?
I think there is tremendous scope for scaling up donor activity in the
broad area of science-intensive regional public goods, including basic
research in health and agriculture. Here successful models are available,
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seed varieties in the Green Revolution in Asia; and donors have an unam-
biguous comparative advantage in the direct provision or local supervi-
sion of this effort. I also believe that donors should be much bolder in
providing debt relief, which is a matter of housecleaning rather than net
resource transfers; here Jubilee 2000 had it right, and the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries initiative has it wrong. But where the current
paper innovates is in advocating a massive and externally funded scaling
up of in-country public service delivery. This is vintage capital funda-
mentalism, and here the challenge reverses itself. The central thrust of the
literature on African development has been to dismiss capital fundamen-
talism as a viable interpretation of Africa’s way forward: are the authors
being too bold?
To answer this I will start with the gap calculation itself. Such calcula-
tions are structurally optimistic, because they are designed to spur the
ambitions of donors. But their empirical failings in traditional growth-
targeting applications are sobering.6 Similar weaknesses confront a gap-
ﬁnancing approach to the MDGs, and particularly one of the scale
proposed here. For Tanzania (the results for Ghana and Uganda are simi-
lar), the authors call for a 78 percent increase in real domestic MDG-
based spending in the ﬁrst year of the program, followed by a decade of
further real increases at nearly 7 percent a year.7 The initial increases in
MDG spending and aid are each on the order of 10 percent of GDP. The
latter is a lower bound, moreover; some big-ticket items are left out, and
constant, state-of-the-art efﬁciency is assumed. Nor is there any genuine
sense in which the program proposed here can look any different in 2016
than it does in 2015, as the authors acknowledge.
It is clear, then, that if absorptive capacity constraints are at all relevant
in African countries, the scale of this program will bring them to the fore.
The question is not whether the “needs” identiﬁed here are genuine; they
are. But the African development literature locates ongoing needs—or
capital shortages—in dysfunctional policy environments, and dysfunc-
tional policy environments in weak institutions. The authors acknowledge
this by limiting their proposal to countries in which policies and institu-
tions are reasonably good, after controlling for income. This is an impor-
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is not whether governance is good relative to income, but whether it is
good enough in absolute terms to avoid sharply diminishing returns or
even outright institutional deterioration when managing a massive scaling
up of public services.
The point that “absorptive capacity matters” is my central one, and I
will brieﬂy develop it in three arenas. First, Sachs has written eloquently
elsewhere about the curse of natural resources. If ﬁnancial resources were
the binding constraint, African countries that have enjoyed persistent
commodity booms should have leveraged those into an exit from the trap.
They have systematically failed to do so. One reason may be that com-
modity rents have tended to become a focal point for distributional strug-
gles that have undermined policy and institutional performance. Aid may
be better in this respect; unlike commodity rents, it is encumbered by
donors, who pay at least some attention to the activities being ﬁnanced.
Paul Collier and Anke Hoefﬂer have shown empirically, for example, that
whereas natural resource abundance tends to increase armed conﬂict,
higher levels of aid do not.8 But the limited and even adverse develop-
ment impacts of commodity rents nonetheless pose serious questions
about state capability in Africa, and about the idea that resources are the
key constraint. If some form of accountability has indeed been critical in
forging a constructive link between aid and conﬂict, the question is
whether this accountability can be scaled up to support a doubling and
more of public service delivery by weak government institutions.
The natural resource curse may also manifest itself via the Dutch dis-
ease, and in my own view the authors are on shaky ground in dismissing
this. It is impossible for monetary policy to peg the real exchange rate
over anything more than a temporary period. A large and persistent aid
inﬂow that is geared toward domestic spending on nontraded goods and
services is therefore very likely to create a serious competitiveness prob-
lem in the near term. In effect, the authors are placing another large bet on
their sequencing argument: the implicit view here is that there is no point
to having a competitive real exchange rate if a country lacks the human
capital to go with it. This argument may be correct, but in the interim
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strongly suggests that trade is more important for growth in Africa than it
is elsewhere.9
Second, the authors assume “perfect delivery” of public services.
Again the scale of the operation gives rise to concern. Improving public
service delivery is currently at the frontier of public sector reform in
Africa. But if institutions are currently weak, does it make sense to
expand their ﬁnancing and their mandate very rapidly? This might even
exacerbate existing weaknesses. In a recent paper, Jean-Paul Azam, Shan-
tayanan Devarajan, and I develop a trap model that is formally similar to
the ones developed in this paper.10 But ours is a dependency trap, in which
donor activities tend to drive out the institutional learning-by-doing that is
critical to improved governance. If donors ignore this link between aid
and institutional development, they can trap themselves and the recipient
in a high-aid, low-institutional-capacity equilibrium. The possibility is
not one we are allowed to dismiss after forty years of high aid and low
growth.
As a third point, there has been substantial recent progress in building
greater accountability into aid design, through the use of outcomes-based
assessments. But how far can such assessments take us in ensuring high
productivity of public service delivery? As Lant Pritchett and Michael
Woolcock point out in a recent paper, many of the MDG services are
both transactions-intensive and discretionary.11 Unlike macroeconomic
reforms, the delivery of many health and education services requires the
collaboration of multiple individuals who make highly discretionary
choices in an environment where many key actions are unobservable.
Such services cannot be delivered by a few politically protected tech-
nocrats, or even by a ministry stamping out a well-deﬁned protocol in dis-
parate locations. They are intrinsically subject to deep incentive
problems. Consistent with this reality, the empirical link from spending
on health and education to outcomes is notoriously weak—a point empha-
sized by the World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report.12
The ﬁnal section of the paper lays out a program to address a set of
donor shortcomings—short horizons, inadequate ambition, and poor
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ness. These shortcomings are serious, and the poverty reduction strategy
process has begun to produce important improvements. Some donor
shortcomings may be intrinsic, however, to a transaction that is ultimately
a component of bilateral foreign policy. It is not clear, for example, that
donors can adopt a credible ten-year horizon for aid to a high-performing
African country whose current leadership might be replaced in short order
by one with, well, short horizons, inadequate ambition, and poor coordi-
nation. Too many times, individual African countries or country pairs of
similar geography have switched places in terms of growth performance.
Examples include Uganda before and after 1986, Tanzania and Kenya in
East Africa, and Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana in West Africa. Changes in the
policy environment in these countries have swung growth differentials by
3 or 4 percentage points or more on a decadal basis. As we speak, land-
locked Zimbabwe and Zambia are switching places in southern Africa.
Aid cannot have a horizon that is longer than the uncertainties inherent in
a fundamentally weak institutional environment. It may be possible to
push horizons to something like ﬁve years; for programs insulated from
political uncertainties (like the science-intensive regional public goods I
mentioned earlier), the horizon can be much longer. But such insulation is
implausible for in-country service delivery on a large scale.
Most fundamentally, improving the effectiveness of aid requires com-
ing to grips with the deep inverse correlation of poverty with institutional
capability. This will require scaling ambitions not only to need but also to
absorptive capacity. A ﬁnal example may convey the complexity of this
issue, even within the group of countries with comparatively strong gov-
ernance. Consider health interventions in Uganda and Ghana. In 1995
Ghana adopted its own structure for coordinating donors, setting up a
sector-wide program in the health ministry to which donors were com-
pelled to conform. This was precisely what Botswana had done from the
outset with its own highly effective aid program—owning the process and
coordinating donors around its own agenda. Ghana is now plausibly in a
position to scale up aggressively in the health sector. 
Uganda emerged from civil war in the mid-1980s and experienced a
remarkable recovery over the next ﬁfteen years or so.13 This was accom-
plished by creating tremendous coherence at the highest levels of the bud-
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and Finance, and the central bank. The spending ministries, in contrast,
have remained a mixture of well-functioning and nonfunctioning entities,
with the health ministry in the latter category. The scaling up advocated
here might therefore face a Ugandan response of the following form: “We
have a functioning budget process and have set our spending priorities
consistent with our needs and the delivery capacity of our ministries. It is
not appropriate, at this time, to move an additional 4 percent of GDP
through our health ministry. Nor do we wish you to set up a competing
health service delivery structure.” To insist in such a context that “it can
and must be done” would at best be a risky strategy for donors.
I close by saying that this is a challenging paper in the deepest and
most constructive sense. I have argued for a more moderate scale of inter-
vention, but there is much that can and must be done in precisely the areas
identiﬁed here. The authors have made a concrete and powerful case for a
retargeting of aid efforts in tropical Africa and a signiﬁcant increase in
overall assistance. 
General discussion: Richard Cooper disagreed sharply with the authors’
proposals for greatly expanding aid to sub-Saharan Africa at this time,
unless one could ensure that the aid could be used effectively. He argued
that the aid would be wasted in many countries in the region because they
lacked the elementary functions of law and order that would be needed to
deliver aid effectively. Cooper also questioned some of the paper’s analy-
sis of Africa’s economic plight. While granting that the region was des-
perately poor compared with many nations in other parts of the world, he
pointed to Africa’s own history as evidence that Africa is not in a subsis-
tence-level poverty trap. Over the past ﬁfty years, average income per
capita has grown by 60 percent, longevity has increased before adjusting
for the impact of AIDS, infant mortality has fallen, and population growth
has been rapid. Nor was Cooper persuaded that geography makes Africa a
special case: other countries, such as Switzerland, are landlocked and
have even fewer resources than Africa. He observed that the British, the
French, and the Portuguese had built important railroads in Africa, which
had fallen into disuse through negligence and the ravages of civil war.
Cooper suggested that drastic measures may be needed in some African
countries, such as a twenty-ﬁrst-century version of the British colonial
ofﬁce (for example, a UN trusteeship, with forces to backstop it), to pro-
230 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:2004
2259-02-Sachs.qxd    8/6/04    11:22    Page  230vide minimal law and order so that economies could begin meaningful
development and make use of expanded aid. 
Edward Glaeser, by contrast, was convinced by the authors’ arguments
on the importance of geography and reasoned that, were it not for strict
immigration laws in the developed countries, no one would be living in
sub-Saharan Africa today. However, given the region’s geography, he
was skeptical about developing agriculture in the region, noting that, with
transportation costs so low, only countries with comparative advantage
should be in the staple crop business.
Robert Gordon found a parallel between the post–World War I repara-
tions imposed on Germany and current plans to greatly expand aid trans-
fers to Africa. In his classic essay “The Economic Consequences of the
Peace,” John Maynard Keynes argued that, through the positions they
took at Versailles, Britain and France had undermined their own export
industries because the reparations they demanded would force a real
devaluation on Germany. Gordon worried that Africa could be similarly
hurt if massive aid transfers led to a real appreciation of currencies there. 
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